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Abstract 
We examined the link between political engagement and the tendency to justify the 
socio-political system. On one hand, confidence in the system should be negatively related to 
political engagement, insofar as it entails reduced desire for social change; on the other hand, 
system confidence should also be positively related to political engagement to the extent that 
it carries an assumption that the system is responsive to FLWL]HQV¶ political efforts. Because of 
the combination of these two opposing forces, the motivation for political engagement should 
be highest at intermediate levels of system confidence. Five studies revealed a negative 
quadratic relationship between system confidence and normative political engagement. In 
two representative surveys, Polish participants with moderate levels of system confidence 
were more likely to vote in political elections (Study 1) and to participate in solidarity-based 
collective action (Study 2). Two field studies demonstrated a negative quadratic relationship 
between system confidence and actual participation in political demonstrations (gender 
equality DQGWHDFKHUV¶protests in Poland; Studies 3 and 4). This pattern of results was further 
corroborated by analyses of data from 50 countries drawn from the World Value Survey: we 
observed negative quadratic relationships between system confidence and collective action as 
well as voting. These relationships were stronger in democratic (vs. non-democratic) regimes 
(Study 5). Our results suggest that some degree of system confidence might be useful to 
stimulate political engagement within the norms of the system.  
Keywords: system justification, political engagement, collective action, voting
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What inverted U can do for your country: A curvilinear relationship between confidence in 
the social system and political engagement 
I went down to the demonstration, to get my fair share of abuse . . . 
5ROOLQJ6WRQHV³<RX&DQ¶W$OZD\V*HW:KDW<RX:DQW´ 
Disenchantment with the political system should be a motivator of political 
engagement in activities aimed at shifting the status quo, such as voting or participation in 
protests. Yet, dissatisfaction and resentment of politics are often accompanied by low 
political activism (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Putnam, 2000). This dynamic was noted by 
Barack Obama in his 2016 address at Howard University: 
³[I]I\RXGRQ¶WJHWZKDW\RXZDQWORQJHQRXJK\RXZLOOHYHQWXDOO\WKLQNWKH
whole system is rigged. And that will lead to more cynicism²and less 
participation, and a downward spiral of more injustice and more anger and 
more despair. And that's never been the source of our progress. That's how we 
cheat ourselves of progress.´ 
In this research we examine the link between political disenchantment and civic 
disengagement. In psychology, these issues may be approached from the perspective of 
system justification theory, which suggests that people are motivated to support existing 
socio-political systems, even if maintaining the status quo sometimes works to their 
disadvantage (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). 
System justification addresses psychological needs by maintaining the sense that the social 
system is familiar, safe, and consensually embraced (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). 
Nevertheless, individuals differ in the extent to which they are motivated to engage in system 
justification (Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012). When the system fails to satisfy RQH¶V 
needs, system confidence should be very low, and people should develop a stronger 
motivation to engage in politics (Jost et al., 2010). Through political engagement people are 
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able to communicate their needs and preferences and to pressure officials to respond to their 
demands (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). 
In support of this theoretical logic, previous research conducted in the US, UK, and 
Greece, suggested that low confidence in the socio-political system was associated with 
willingness to participate in collective protests (Jost et al., 2012). 1 However, in other 
contexts, such as post-Communist countries where support for the socio-political system is 
relatively low, higher confidence in the system seems to be associated with political 
engagement (Cichocka & Jost, 2014). For example, Skarzynska and Henne (2012) observed 
that system confidence in Poland was a positive predictor of political action, such as meeting 
with politicians or participating in demonstrations.  
One explanation for these seemingly contradictory effects is that low system 
confidence may be associated with low levels of political efficacy, such as the assumption 
WKDWRQH¶VDFWLRQVLQWKHSROLWLFDOVSKHUHwill be ineffective, because the authorities are unable 
or unZLOOLQJWRUHVSRQGWRFLWL]HQV¶GHPDQGVCorcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 2015; Craig, 
Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Long, 1978). A sense of political efficacy 
is essential for civic engagement, but individuals who fail to support the system often feel 
that it is impossible to change things (González et al., 2005; Mannarini, Legittimo, & Taló, 
2008; Zimmerman, 1989). In this way, system justification may be positively associated with 
political efficacy (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Osborne, Yogeeswaran, & Sibley, 2015). 
Similarly, system confidence should capture the belief that the system will be appropriately 
UHVSRQVLYHWRRQH¶Vefforts to achieve political outcomes by working within the norms of the 
system. Such efforts are conceptualized as normative political actions, which include voting 
                                                        
1
 In this article, ZHXVHWKHWHUP³V\VWHPMXVWLILFDWLRQ´WRUHIHUWRWKHmotivational process of 
MXVWLI\LQJWKHV\VWHPDQGWKHWHUP³V\VWHPFRQILGHQFH´WRUHIHUto RQH¶VFXUUHQWlevel of 
satisfaction with the system (see also Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu & Fitzimons, 2011). 
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and participating in peaceful demonstrations (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Jost et al., 2012; 
Tausch et al., 2011; Verba et al., 1995; Wright et al., 1990).  
We therefore propose that as dissatisfaction with the political system increases, 
SHRSOH¶VIDLWKWKDWWKHy can influence the status quo by working within the system should 
decline, all other things being equal. This decline in political efficacy might counteract the 
mobilizing effect of dissatisfaction. In other words, system confidence may exert two 
opposing effects: On one hand, system confidence should be negatively related to normative 
political engagement, insofar as it involves a decreased desire for social change in the first 
place; on the other hand, system confidence should be positively related to normative 
political engagement, because it includes faith in the effectiveness of political participation. 
For example, dissatisfaction with the educational system appears to have motivated recent 
teacher protests in several countries (Wong & Ross, 2015). At the same time, the teachers 
presumably had some degree of confidence in the system if they believed that the authorities 
would be responsive to their demands. 
Because of these two processes, we hypothesized that the motivation for normative 
political engagement should be greatest at intermediate (rather than high or low) levels of 
system confidence (for parallel examples of curvilinear predictions in social and personality 
psychology, see Brewer, 1991; McGuire, 1968, 1997). Even though political engagement 
aimed at changing the status quo should be associated with lower system confidence in 
general, a certain degree of system confidence is needed to assume that the authorities will be 
responsive to such engagement. This hypothesis is highly consistent with $WNLQVRQ¶V
expectancy-value theory, which VSHFLILHVWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vmotivation to engage in a 
particular task is a mathematical product of the value of the task and his or her expectation of 
completing the task successfully. According to Atkinson, achievement motivation should be 
strongest for tasks of moderate value and expectancy. If the task is too difficult, then the 
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expectation of success will be very low. On the other hand, if the task is too easy, then it 
might not be perceived as valuable or attractive. In line with this theorizing, we propose that 
the likelihood of political engagement will be shaped by the product of the value people place 
on changing the status quo and their expectation that such efforts will be successful in 
achieving the goal.  
To return to the example of teacher protests, the likelihood of participating in protest 
should be greatest when teachers experience some desire for change (i.e., they value the 
potential outcomes of the protest), but at the same time feel that the government will be at 
least somewhat responsive to their demands (i.e., their expectation that the protest will lead to 
desired consequences is sufficiently high; see also Corcoran et al., 2015). In comparison, 
teachers with extremely low levels of system confidence may possess a strong need for 
change but feel that there is a zero (or near-zero) chance that their demands will be met; as a 
result, their likelihood of participating in the protest should also be near zero. Teachers with 
extremely high levels of system confidence would have a great deal of faith in the 
government¶V responsiveness but no real need for social change; they, too, would be unlikely 
to join the protest. Thus, the likelihood of political participation would the product (rather 
than the sum) of the need for change and beliefs about efficacy associated with system 
confidence. Likelihood of political engagement would then be maximized at moderate levels 
of system confidence, which strike a balance between the need for change and beliefs about 
political efficacy.  Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between system confidence 
and political engagement should be curvilinear²a negative quadratic effect. Figure 1 
illustrates our model schematically. 
- Figure 1 - 
We suggest that this relationship should hold for various forms of political 
participation, including voting and collective action. Voting is a conventional, 
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institutionalized form of normative political engagement (Adler & Goggin, 2005; Putnam, 
2000; van Steklenburg, Klandermans, & Akkerman 2016). Through voting people 
communicate their preferences concerning the way the political system should work. Thus, 
although voting may well be used to express support for the status quo, in democratic 
societies participating in elections typically signifies an attempt to influence the socio-
political system. Participation in protests or demonstrations may be considered a 
noninstitutionalized (yet still normatively acceptable) mode of political engagement that 
supplements institutionalized activities, in an effort to influence politics in a democratic 
system (van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). Both forms of political engagement should be most 
appealing when the system is perceived as requiring at least some improvement but at the 
same time working well enough to heed calls for improvement. 
Overview  
In the current research program we examined the pattern of relations between 
individual differences in system confidence and political engagement. In a set of survey and 
field studies we investigated the novel hypothesis that a negative quadratic relationship 
would hold between system confidence and two forms of political engagement: voting and 
collective action. We examined actual political behavior as well as intentions to engage in 
political action. To increase the generalizability of results, we sought to recruit non-student 
samples and consider non-³WEIRD´ (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and 
Democratic) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). We sought to analyze datasets 
with at least 173 participants, which would provide 80% power to detect an effect of r = 
.21²the typical effect in social/personality psychology (Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 
2003; see also Vazire, 2015). 
In Study 1, we examined the effect of system confidence on intentions to vote using a 
large nationally representative survey conducted in Poland. In Study 2, which was part of 
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another nationally representative survey in Poland, we examined the effect of confidence in 
the European Union system on intentions to participate in solidarity-based collective action 
on behalf of another country. In Study 3 we measured confidence in the gender system 
among Polish women and investigated whether it predicted participation in a feminist 
demonstration. In Study 4, we measured general system confidence among Polish teachers 
and tested whether it predicted participation in a demonstration calling for UDLVHVLQWHDFKHUV¶
salaries. Finally, in Study 5 we examined the negative quadratic effect of system confidence 
on voting and normative collective action in the World Values Survey and sought to 
determine whether the strength of this relationship would depend on the social context, 
namely the type of political regime (democratic vs. non-democratic). 
To examine the relationship between system confidence and political engagement, in 
each study we performed a regression analysis in which we examined the linear and quadratic 
effects of mean-centered system confidence on the different indices political engagement. In 
each study we also tested the regression models adjusting for basic demographics and 
political orientation. All models were diagnosed for influential observations.  
Study 1 
 In Study 1 we tested the curvilinear hypothesis in a nationally representative sample 
of Polish citizens. We focused on the political system and examined the quadratic effect of 
system confidence on intentions to vote in political elections. Although voting can serve to 
express support for the status quo, political campaigns often promote agendas designed to 
improve the present state of affairs, even if proposed changes are only incremental or have 
the larger aim to restore the way society is assumed to have worked in the past (e.g., see Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). 
Method 
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Participants and procedure. We analyzed data from a 2009 domestic survey 
involving a large nationwide, statistically representative sample of Polish adults (N = 979). 
Computer-assisted personal interviews were conducted with 979 (445 men) individuals, 
between the ages of 18 and 89 years (M
 
= 48.22, SD = 18.03). Sample demographic 
characteristics matched those of the 2011 Polish Census (Central Statistical Office, 2012). 
This dataset was analyzed by Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, and Wójcik (2013), Cichocka, 
Winiewski, Bilewicz, Bukowski, and Jost (2015), and Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and 
Bilewicz (2013), but none of these other studies considered the relationship between system 
confidence and political engagement. In line with institutional guidelines on externally 
funded survey research, this study was exempt from research ethics committee approval. 
Measures. 
System confidence was measured with three items: ³In general, the Polish political 
V\VWHPRSHUDWHVDVLWVKRXOG´³,QJHQHUDORXUVRFLHW\LVIDLU´DQG³,Q3RODQG, everyone has a 
IDLUVKRWDWZHDOWKDQGKDSSLQHVV´Kay & Jost, 2003; see Cichocka et al., 2015). Participants 
responded on a 5-point scale from 1= definitely disagree to 5 = definitely agree Į M = 
2.05, SD = 0.92).  
Political engagement intentions were operationalized as voting intentions, measured 
with a single question: ³If the parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, would you 
SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHP"´7KUHHUHVSRQVHRSWLRQVZHUH available: I would definitely participate (n 
=  473), I GRQ¶WNQRZ (n = 256) and I would definitely not participate (n =  243). Responses 
were recoded so that higher numbers expressed higher political engagement intentions.   
Adjustment variables included gender, age, education and political conservatism. 
Education was measured in terms of completed years of education (M = 11.72, SD = 3.52). 
Political conservatism was assessed with a single item measure ranging from 1 (definitely 
left-wing) to 7 (definitely right-wing). A ODUJHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVUHSOLHG³difficult to say´
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to the political conservatism question (n = 259), so we re-coded these responses at the scale 
midpoint in political conservatism (M = 4.31, SD = 1.15).   
Results  
Bivariate analyses. Correlations between continuous and ordinal variables are 
presented in Table 1. Voting intentions were positively related to system confidence as well 
as political conservatism. Independent sample t-tests further revealed that male and female 
participants did not differ with respect to system confidence, t(959) = 0.70, p = .483, d = 
0.05, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.17]. On the other hand, gender differentiated voting intentions, F2(2) = 
7.28, p = .026. Men were more willing to vote in the elections (53.4%) than women (44.7%).  
- Table 1 - 
Logistic regression analysis with voting intentions as the outcome. In order to 
examine the relationship between voting intentions and system confidence, we conducted a 
multinomial logistic regression (Table 2).2 Voting intentions were treated as a nominal 
dependent variable and individuals who declared that they would not participate in the 
parliamentary elections served as the comparison group. The analysis revealed a significant 
linear effect of system confidence on intentions to votHUHODWLYHWR³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´
there was a significant positive effect IRUUHVSRQGLQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´B = 0.54, OR = 1.71, p 
< .001, as weOODV³,ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´B = 0.49, OR = 1.63, p < .001. We also found 
significant quadratic effects of system confidence on intentions to vote. Relative to those who 
would not vRWHUHVSRQGLQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´B = -0.34, OR = 0.71, p < .001, as ZHOODV³,
ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´B = -0.18, OR = 0.84, p = .017, were both negatively predicted by the 
quadratic effect of system confidence. System confidence was associated with increased odds 
RIUHVSRQGLQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´RU´,ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´UHODWLYHWR³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´
                                                        
2
 Due to the ordinal measurement of voting intentions, an ordered logistic regression was first 
conducted (see the Supplement). Because it did not meet the parallel slopes assumption 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2005), we employed a multinomial logistic regression instead. 
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only up to a point (system confidence scores of 2.84 or 0.86 SD IRU³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´DQd 3.41 
or 1.48 SD IRU³,ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´DIWHUZKLFKLWVHIIHFWEHFDPHQHJDWLYHVHH)LJXUH2). 
This indicates that the probability of declaring willingness to participate in upcoming 
elections, relative to not participating, was highest at moderate levels of system confidence. 
The pattern of results was similar when we included adjustment variables (gender, age, 
education and political conservatism) in the model (see the Supplement). To test for 
influential cases we performed two binary logistic regressions comparing the reference 
FDWHJRU\ZLWK³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´DQG³,ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´UHVSRQVHV Regardless of including or 
H[FOXGLQJDGMXVWPHQWYDULDEOHVQRLQIOXHQWLDOFDVHVZHUHLGHQWLILHGDOO&RRN¶VGLVWDQFHV
.28; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2005).  
- Table 2- 
- Figure 2- 
Discussion 
Among a large, representative sample, higher system confidence was associated with 
higher likelihood of voting, in line with past research linking voter turnout with trust in the 
government and satisfaction with the political system (e.g., Grönlund & Setälä, 2007). 
However, as we predicted, this linear effect was qualified by a significant negative quadratic 
relationship between system confidence and voting intentions: the probability of voting was 
highest at intermediate levels of system confidence.  
Study 2 
 In Study 2 we sought to replicate our effects in another representative survey. This 
time, we considered a different type of political engagement²willingness to participate in 
collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged group (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 
2015). In Study 2 we asked participants about their willingness to protest on behalf of a 
socio-political issue that was salient at the time of data collection²the Russian involvement 
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in Ukraine after the 2014 EuroMaidan protests. According to national polls, the majority of 
Poles had been following the situation closely, and many expressed support for the European 
8QLRQ¶VVDQFWLRQVDJDLQVW5XVVLD.RZDOF]XN7KXVWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ8NUDLQHZDV
associated witKDWWHPSWVWRLQIOXHQFHWKH(8¶VVWDQFHWRZDUGV5XVVLD7KHUHIRUHLQWKLV
context, we measured confidence in the political system of the European Union. Because we 
asked about collective action in solidarity with Ukrainians, we adjusted our analyses for 
attitudes toward this national group. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Study 2 was part of a nationwide survey conducted in 
Poland in 2014. The survey employed the same methodology as the survey used in Study 1. 
Participants were 1007 (472 men) individuals, aged between 18 and 87 (M
 
= 47.59, SD = 
17.59). This dataset was analyzed by Jaworska (2016) in a separate project examining 
intergroup attitudes. In line with institutional guidelines on externally funded survey research, 
this study was exempt from research ethics committee approval. 
Measures. 
System confidence. Three items selected from the System Justification Scale (Kay & 
Jost, 2003) and adjusted to the context of the European Union formed the measure of 
European system confidence: ³In general, I find the European Union V\VWHPWREHIDLU´³The 
European Union political systHPRSHUDWHVDVLWVKRXOG´DQG³The European Union system 
VKRXOGEHUDGLFDOO\UHVWUXFWXUHG´ (reverse-scored). Participants responded on a 7-point 
response scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (Į M = 3.66, 
SD = 1.36). 
Political engagement intentions were measured with two items capturing intentions to 
engage in collective action in solidarity with Ukraine: ³I would participate in a demonstration 
DJDLQVW5XVVLD¶VLQYDVLRQLQ Ukraine.´ and ³I would participate in a demonstration supporting 
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democratic changes in Ukraine´Participants responded on a 7-point response scale ranging 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (r[927] = .74, p < .001, M = 3.62, SD = 
2.08). 
Adjustment variables included attitudes toward Ukrainians, gender, age, education 
and political conservatism. Attitudes toward Ukrainians were measured with three items, e.g.:  
³,IHHOUHVSHFWWRZDUG 8NUDLQLDQV´, with a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree (Į = .70, M = 4.98, SD =
 
1.28). Education was measured in terms of 
completed years of education (M = 12.91, SD = 3.50). Political conservatism was assessed 
with a single item measure ranging from 1 (definitely left-wing) to 7 (definitely right-wing). A 
ODUJHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVUHSOLHG³GLIILFXOWWRVD\´WRWKHSROLWLFDOconservatism question (n 
= 213), so we re-coded these responses at the scale midpoint in political conservatism (M = 
4.24, SD = 1.38).   
Results  
Bivariate analyses. Correlations between continuous variables are presented in Table 
3. Collective action intentions were unrelated to system confidence, but they were positively 
correlated with conservatism, as well as with attitudes toward Ukrainians. Independent t-tests 
indicated that gender was significantly related to collective action intentions, t(963) = 2.83, p 
= .005, d = 0.18, 95% CI [0.06, 0.31], and system confidence, t(955) = -2.30, p = .022, d = 
0.15, 95% CI [0.02, 0.28]. In comparison to women, men manifested higher collective action 
intentions (Mmen = 3.82, SDmen = 2.12 vs. Mwomen = 3.44, SDwomen = 2.03) and lower system 
confidence (Mmen = 3.55, SDmen = 1.37 vs. Mwomen = 3.76, SDwomen = 1.34).  
- Table 3- 
Linear regression analysis with collective action intentions as the outcome. In 
order to examine the relationship between collective action intentions and system confidence, 
we conducted a hierarchical linear regression analysis (Table 4). Collective action intentions 
Running head: SYSTEM CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT                  15 
 
were treated as the dependent variable. Because in this study we measured political 
engagement on behalf of an out-group, the following models adjusted for attitudes toward 
this group.3 System confidence was not linearly related to collective action intentions, B = -
0.05, SE  ȕ -.03, p = .275, but, in line with our predictions, we found a significant 
negative quadratic effect of system confidence on collective action intentions, B = -0.06, SE 
 ȕ -.07, p = .025 (Model 2). At its low values EU system confidence was associated 
with the intention to engage in collective action on behalf of Ukraine, but for individuals 
whose EU system confidence was higher than 3.24 (or -0.31 SD), justifying the political 
system of the EU was associated with lower intentions to engage in collective action (Figure 
3). Adding other adjustment variables (i.e., gender, age, education and political conservatism) 
to the regression equation did not affect the quadratic term for system confidence (see the 
Supplement). Regardless of including or excluding adjustment variables, no influential cases 
ZHUHLGHQWLILHGDOO&RRN¶VDs < .03). 
- Table 4 - 
- Figure 3 - 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, again conducted in Poland, intentions to take part in collective action in 
solidarity with another country²Ukraine, were highest at intermediate levels of system 
confidence. This effect appeared after we accounted for the general attitudes toward 
Ukrainians, suggesting that the curvilinear effect of system confidence on the collective 
action intentions was unique to political engagement. Given the international context of the 
study, we analyzed confidence in the political system of the European Union. Results were 
                                                        
3
 When this variable was omitted, neither the linear, nor the quadratic effect is significant (see 
the Supplement). 
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consisted with those obtained in Study 1, confirming that the effects extend beyond the 
context of justification of the national systems. 
Study 3 
 In Studies 1-2 we examined the link between system confidence and normative 
political engagement intentions. The disadvantage of such approach is that it relies on 
SHRSOH¶VGHFODUDWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQWKHLUDFWXDO participation in political activities. Therefore, in 
Studies 3 and 4 we sought to collect data during actual political events. In the first field study, 
data were collected from actual demonstrators versus bystanders at a protest march about 
gender inequality. Thus, compared to Study 2, the focus shifts to a different form of 
normative political engagement (participation in a collective action on behalf of the own 
group, i.e. women) and to a different system (gender-relations).  
While lacking the obvious institutional structures of socio-political systems such as 
national or European governments, the gender system has important features in common with 
them (Risman, 2004). Critically, people vary in the extent to which they perceive the gender 
system to be just (Jost & Kay, 2005), changing (Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 
2009), and changeable via collective action (Deutsch, 2007). Research has shown that 
participation in normative collective action is predicted by variables associated with rejection 
of the gender status quo (e.g., Duncan, 1999), and variables associated with the perception 
that collective action is likely to be effective (Swank & Fahs, 2014). Therefore, while the 
gender system differs in some respects from other systems, our theoretical logic implies that a 
quadratic relationship may also hold between confidence of this system and participation in 
normative collective action designed to change it²in this case, participation in a protest.   
 Moreover, in Study 3 we sought to examine whether the quadratic effect would hold 
only for normative forms of political engagement. We expected that this relationship would 
play out differently for engagement in non-normative political behaviour that violates the 
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laws and norms of the system (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). Such actions are 
more likely to be taken by those who have little hope for change but at the same time feel 
they have nothing to lose (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Tausch et al., 
2011). Therefore, perceptions of responsiveness are likely to play a different role in non-
normative political engagement. In fact, we would expect that maximum levels of non-
normative political engagement would occur when people desire change and feel that the 
system is not responsive to their efforts. Thus, non-normative actions should be predicted by 
a strong disappointment with the system. To test this prediction in Study 3 we additionally 
examined intentions to take part in normative and non-normative collective actions in support 
for gender equality. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. We used data from a larger survey conducted among 
257 adult women aged between 18 and 85 (M = 34.65; SD = 14.91) who either did (n = 174) 
or did not (n = 83) participate in Manifa²an annual march in support of ZRPHQ¶VULJKWV
taking place in Warsaw, Poland.4 Participants were recruited during the protest by research 
assistants instructed to interview as many individuals as possible, with the aim of collecting 
approximately 250 responses (this value was estimated to be realistic given the time period 
and number of available research assistants). Respondents who were not taking part in the 
protest were recruited among observers and passersby. Before taking part in the study, 
participants were asked to confirm whether they were or were not taking part in the march. 
This study was approved by the Committee on Research Ethics, Faculty of Psychology, 
University of Warsaw DVSDUWRIDSURMHFWHQWLWOHG³Reactive and proactive collective action´. 
Measures.  
                                                        
4To comply with conditions set by the Committee of Research Ethics, the final sample 
excludes data from nine participants who were minors and seven others who failed to report 
their age.  
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Gender-related system confidence was measured with an eight-item scale developed 
by Jost and Kay (2005) which was translated into Polish. Sample item reads³Most policies 
relating to gender and the sexual division of labor serve the greater good.´Participants 
responded using a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (Į ; M 
= 2.91, SD = 0.90). 
Political engagement was measured with four indices:  
Protest participation was operationalized as actual participation in the march (0 = did 
not participate, 1= participated). Those actually marching were approached on the assumption 
that they were protestors, and those watching or walking nearby but not taking part were 
approached on the assumption that they were non-protestors. Their protest status was also 
confirmed verbally.  
Support for collective action was measured with three items capturing participants 
VXSSRUWIRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQRQEHKDOIRIZRPHQ³I support actions aimed at improving the 
situation of women in Poland´, ³I do not see a need to participate in actions aimed at 
improving the situation of women in Poland.´(reverse coded)DQG³I would like to 
participate in actions aimed at improving the situation of women in Poland´. Participants 
responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree (Į 75; M = 6.29, SD 
= 1.05). 
Normative collective action intentions. Participants were asked to what extent they 
were willing to participate in the following collective actions aimed at improving the 
situation of women in Poland: 1) distributing posters, flyers and links, 2) joining a legal 
demonstration, 3) signing a petition. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 = Not 
at all to 7 = Very much so (Į 75; M = 5.81, SD = 1.35). 
Non-normative collective action intentions. Participants were also asked to what 
extent they were willing to participate in the following collective actions aimed at improving 
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the situation of women in Poland: 1) blocking streets, 2) destroying state property, 3) 
occupying state buildings. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much so (Į 84; M = 2.53, SD = 1.73). 
Adjustment variables included age, education and political conservatism with respect 
to economic and social issues. Education was assessed in terms of the highest completed 
level of education (1 = primary school, 2 = lower secondary school, 3 = vocational school, 4 
= secondary school, 5 = university degree; M = 4.66, SD = 0.59). Two items measuring 
economic (M = 3.22; SD = 1.74) and social political conservatism (M = 2.20, SD = 1.48) used 
a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 = definitely left-wing to 7 = definitely right-wing. As 
in previous research conducted in the Polish context (e.g., Cichocka, Bilewicz, Jost, 
Marrouch, & Witkowska, 2016; Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003), the two items were weakly 
correlated, r (252) = .24, p < .001. We treated them as separate indices of political 
orientation. 5 
Results  
Bivariate analyses. Correlations between continuous variables are presented in Table 
5. Differences between protesters and non-protesters were examined with independent t-tests. 
We first considered the relationships between different indices of political engagement. 
Those who took part in the demonstration declared stronger intentions for normative 
collective action (M = 6.11, SD = 0.99), than those who did not take part (M = 5.17, SD = 
1.72), t(108.93) = 4.63, p <.001, d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.47, 1.01]. Those who took part in the 
demonstration also showed stronger support for collective action (M = 6.46, SD = 0.74), than 
those who did not take part (M = 5.93, SD = 1.44), t(102.82) = 3.15, p =.002, d = 0.52, 95% 
CI [0.25, 0.78]. We did not find a significant difference in intentions to take part in non-
                                                        
5
 Perceptions of protest efficacy were also measured, but because these were administered 
only to protesters (and not observers), they were excluded from the main analyses.  
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normative collective action between protesters and non-protesters, t(255) = 0.72, p = .475, d 
= 0.10, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.36]. Intentions for normative and non-normative collective action 
were positively correlated (Table 5). Finally, support for collective action was significantly 
correlated with intentions for normative collective action, and significantly, although 
relatively less strongly (Z = 5.01, p < .001) correlated with intentions for non-normative 
collective action. Overall, protest participation and support for collective action were more 
strongly linked to normative, compared to non-normative, collective action intentions.  
Gender system confidence was negatively correlated with all continuous indices of 
political engagement, and was generally lower among protesters (M = 2.73, SD = 0.74) than 
among non-protesters (M = 3.28, SD = 1.08), t(119.73) = 4.21, p <.001, d = 0.53, 95% CI 
[0.27, 0.80]. All indices of political engagement were also negatively correlated with social 
and economic conservatism (although the correlation between social conservatism and non-
normative collective action intentions was not significant). Protesters were also less 
conservative both in terms of social (M = 1.97, SD = 1.15) and economic (M =3.03, SD = 
1.71) issues than non-protesters (M = 2.60, SD = 1.93 and M = 3.63, SD = 1.76, respectively), 
ps < .011. 
- Table 5 ± 
Logistic regression analysis with actual protest participation as the outcome. For 
the analysis of political behavior, we performed a series of binomial logistic regressions with 
participation in the demonstration as the dependent variable. Results of the binomial logistic 
regression (Table 6, Model 2) demonstrated that both the linear, B = -0.63, OR = 0.54, p < 
.001, and quadratic, B = -0.42, OR = 0.66, p = .008, effects were significant. At its low values 
gender system confidence increased the probability of political engagement but for 
individuals whose gender system confidence was higher than 2.16 (or -0.83 SDs), supporting 
the existing system of gender relations decreased the probability of political engagement 
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(Figure 4). Including adjustment variables did not affect the pattern of results (see the 
Supplement)1RLQIOXHQWLDOFDVHVZHUHLGHQWLILHG&RRN¶VDs < .84).  
- Table 6 ± 
- Figure 4 - 
Linear regression analyses with support for collective action as the outcome. We 
conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the relationship between system 
confidence and general support for collective action (Table 7). The initial analyses revealed a 
singlHLQIOXHQWLDOFDVHZLWK&RRN¶V distance greater than 1 (D = 2.10), so this case was 
excluded from the analyses. 6 In Model 2, both the linear, B = -0.35, SE = 0.ȕ -.29, p < 
.001, and the quadratic, B = -0.25, SE = 0.ȕ -.29, p < .001, effects were significant. 
Gender system confidence increased general support for collective action to a certain point 
(2.21 or -0.78 SDs), after which its effect became negative. The pattern of results remained 
the same when we included the adjustment variables in the model (see the Supplement). 
Overall, results for the endorsement of collective action on behalf of women supported our 
hypotheses about the inverted-U relationship between system confidence and political 
engagement. 
- Table 7 ± 
Linear regression analyses with normative and non-normative collective action 
intentions as outcomes. We then analyzed intentions to engage in normative collective 
action with a similar hierarchical linear regression (Table 8). The initial analyses revealed the 
same influentiaOFDVHZLWK&RRN¶V distance greater than 1 (D = 1.13), so this case was 
excluded from the analyses.7 Model 2 revealed a significant linear, B = -0.54, SE = 0.09ȕ 
-.35, p < .001, and marginally significant quadratic, B = -0.13, SE = 0.ȕ -.11, p = .055, 
                                                        
6 Similar effects were obtained when this case was retained (see the Supplement). 
7
 The quadratic effect was not significant when this case was included (see the Supplement). 
No influential cases were identified for analyses with adjustment variables. 
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effect of gender system confidence on normative collective action. Although the quadratic 
effect for gender system confidence was marginally significant, the inflection point fell 
outside of the range of possible values for this variable (0.83 or -2.31 SDs). When adjustment 
variables were entered into the regression equation, the quadratic effect of gender system 
confidence was nonsignificant (see the Supplement).  
Finally, we examined a regression model with intentions to take part in non-normative 
collective action as the outcome variable (Table 8). In line with our expectations, in Model 2 
there was no quadratic effect of system confidence on non-normative collective action 
intentions, B = 0.05, SE = 0.ȕ p = .527. We did find a significant linear effect B = -
0.34, SE = 0.ȕ -.18, p = .007. However, the linear effect was no longer significant when 
we included adjustment variables in the analysis (see the Supplement).  No influential cases 
ZHUHLGHQWLILHGDOO&RRN¶VDs < .20). 
- Table 8 - 
Discussion  
Study 3 revealed a negative quadratic effect of gender system confidence on 
normative political engagement. This effect was present for actual participation in a peaceful 
feminist demonstration, as well as for intentions to engage in other forms of normative 
collective action on behalf of women (although the latter effect was only marginally 
significant). Furthermore, the analyses for general support for collective action on behalf of 
women corroborated the effects obtained for actual and intended normative collective action. 
In all cases, the relationship between system confidence and political engagement was 
positive at the extreme low levels of system confidence. In line with the effects obtained in 
Studies 1-2, this relationship then reversed, although this happened still at relatively low 
levels of system confidence. This pattern of results may be a consequence of a predominance 
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of political activists in the sample, which might have resulted in relatively low overall levels 
of gender system confidence.  
 We did not obtain a similar negative quadratic effect of system confidence on 
intentions to engage in non-normative collective action on behalf of women. In line with our 
expectations, non-normative collective actions intentions had a negative linear relationship 
with gender system confidence, indicating that this type of actions might be linked to strong 
disappointment with the system. This finding is consistent with past research on the links 
between low system confidence and support for disruptive forms of protest (Jost et al., 2012).  
Study 4 
Study 4 again focused on political behavior in terms of participation in a public 
demonstration. We examined the quadratic effect of general system confidence on taking part 
LQDSURWHVWRUJDQL]HGE\DWHDFKHUV¶XQLRQLQ3RODQG7KHSURWHVWadvocated an increase in 
WHDFKHUV¶ZDJHVDQGKLJKHUIXQGVDOORFDWHGWRHGXFDWLRQLQJHQHUDOWe also examined 
whether system confidence is indeed positively correlated with beliefs in system 
responsiveness and negatively correlated with need for change²the two factors likely 
contributing to the relationship between system confidence and political engagement. 
Therefore, Study 4 included measures of need for change and two forms of political efficacy. 
We measured external political efficacy which corresponds to the perceptions that the 
SROLWLFDOV\VWHPLVUHVSRQVLYHWRRQH¶VGHPDQGV. :HDOVRPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUFHSWLRns 
of collective efficacy in the protest which captures beliefs in the effectiveness of the 
collective effort²one of the main predictors of collective action intentions that has been 
identified in previous research (Bandura, 1997; Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki, & 
Branscombe, 2016; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2010; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008). We predicted that justifying the political system would be especially strongly 
associated with external political efficacy, compared to collective efficacy. 
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Method 
Participants and procedure. We used data from a larger survey conducted among 
276 Polish teachers (39 men, 25 missing), aged between 25 and 78 (M
 
= 43.31 SD = 9.11), 
who either did (n = 235) or did not participate (n = 41) in a protest organized by Polish 
WHDFKHUV¶XQLRQVLQ:DUVDZAs in Study 3, a group of research assistants interviewed 
participants during the protest, with the aim to conduct as many interviews as possible aiming 
at 250. Those who did not take part in the protest were recruited online, via teachers-
dedicated Internet forums. We included data from all teachers who (a) completed the online 
survey on the day of the protest and during the six days afterwards, and (b) explicitly 
declared in the survey that they had refrained from participating in the protest. This study was 
approved by the Committee on Research Ethics, Faculty of Psychology, University of 
Warsaw DVSDUWRIDSURMHFWHQWLWOHG³Reactive and proactive collective action´ 
Measures.  
System confidence was measured with the Polish translation of the eight item Kay 
and Jost (2003) scale. Sample item reads³In general, the Polish political system operates as 
it should´Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree 
Į M = 3.00, SD = 0.90).  
Political engagement was measured with two indices: 
Protest participation was operationalized as actual participation in the protest, as in 
Study 3 (0 = did not participate, 1= participated). 
Support for collective action was measured with three items capturing participants 
support for collective action. These items the same as those used in Study 3 except that they 
referred to the situation of teachers in Poland. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = 
strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree (Į 61; M = 6.09, SD = 1.06). 
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External political efficacy perceptions were measured with one item capturing 
government responsiveness: ³7KHJRYHUQPHQWJHQHUDOO\FRQVLGHUVWHDFKHU¶VSURWHVWV´
Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree (M = 
2.25, SD = 1.32).8  
Collective efficacy was measured with one item capturing the efficacy of the 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQVHHYDQ=RPHUHQHWDO³,WKLQNWRGD\¶VSURWHVWKDVDFKDQFHWR
VXFFHHG´3articipants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree 
(M = 4.29, SD = 1.62). 
Need for change ZDVPHDVXUHGZLWKRQHLWHP³7KHVLWXDWLRQRIWHDFKHUVLQ3RODQG
QHHGVWRFKDQJH´. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = 
strongly agree (M = 5.74, SD = 1.54).  
Adjustment variables. Analyses were adjusted for gender, age and political 
conservatism with respect to social (M = 3.83, SD = 1.62) and economic (M = 4.11, SD = 
1.55) issues measured as in Study 3, r(229) = .13, p = .044.  
Results 
Bivariate analyses. We first examined whether the two indices of political 
engagement were related. Using an independent samples t-test, we found that indeed those 
who took part in the demonstration also showed stronger support for collective action (M = 
6.24, SD = 0.96), than those how did not take part (M = 5.25, SD = 1.21), t(45.36) = 4.77, p < 
.001, d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.42, 1.12]. Correlations between continuous variables are presented 
in Table 9. In line with our predictions, system confidence was significantly negatively 
                                                        
8
 The survey included one other item measuring external efficacy (³3UHVVXUHIURPYDULRXV
social groups can change government SROLFLHV´), but more than 50% of responses were 
missing because of a printing error. Therefore, it was omitted from the analyses. The survey 
also included a measure of the powerlessness component of political alienation (Radkiewicz, 
2007), which was positively correlated with external political efficacy and negatively 
correlated with system confidence.   
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correlated with need for change and significantly positively correlated with external political 
efficacy9. The correlation between system confidence and feelings of collective efficacy was 
weak and non-significant.   
Somewhat surprisingly, there were no significant differences between protesters and 
non-protesters in terms of system confidence, t(47.53) = 1.35, p = .18, d = 0.23, 95% CI [-
0.10, 0.56], or need for change, t(260) = 0.51, p = .61, d = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.42], 
although need for change was positively associated with support for collective action. In this 
sample, external political efficacy was higher among non-protesters (M = 2.83, SD = 1.39) 
than protesters (M= 2.15, SD = 1.28), t(271) = 3.10, p = .002, d = 0.53, 95% CI [0.19, 0.86], 
and it was negatively associated with support for collective action. Collective efficacy was 
higher among protesters (M = 4.42, SD = 1.34) than non-protesters (M = 3.61, SD = 1.64), 
t(271) = 2.99, p = .003, d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.17, 0.84], and it was positively associated with 
support for collective action. 
None of the indices of political engagement were associated with political 
conservatism. Male and female participants did not differ with respect to protest 
participation, support for collective action, external political efficacy, or need for change, all 
ps > .388, all ds < 0.16. However, gender differentiated system confidence, t(249) = 3.56, p < 
.001, d = 0.64, 95% CI [0.28, 1.00], and collective efficacy t(238) = 3.21, p = .002, d = 0.59, 
95% CI [0.22, 0.95]. In comparison to women, men manifested higher political system 
                                                        
9
 We also tested for quadratic relationships between need for change/external political 
efficacy and system confidence. We observed significant negative quadratic effects of need 
for change (ȕ = -.18, p = .04) and external political efficacy (ȕ = -.16, p = .03) on system 
confidence, but these were weaker than the linear effects (ȕ = -.29, p = .001, and ȕ = .50, p < 
.001, respectively). If we consider the possibility that the link between system confidence and 
political engagement would be influenced by the product of the two quadratic effects, then 
we would expect a negative quartic effect of system confidence on political engagement. A 
negative quartic effect would still be consistent with our broader hypothesis that political 
engagement should be highest at moderate levels of system confidence. 
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confidence (Mmen = 3.49, SDmen = 0.70 vs. Mwomen = 2.94, SDwomen = 0.91), and higher 
collective efficacy (Mmen = 5.09, SDmen = 1.40 vs. Mwomen = 4.16, SDwomen = 1.61). 
- Table 9 - 
Logistic regression analysis with actual protest participation as the outcome. As 
in Study 3, we then conducted a binary logistic regression to examine the relationship 
between system confidence and participation in the demonstration (Table 10). Model 2 
revealed a non-significant linear, B = -0.23, OR = 0.79, p = .189, and significant quadratic, B 
= -0.34, OR = 0.71, p = .020, effect of system confidence on protest participation. System 
confidence heightened the probability of participating in the protest only for those who 
scored lower than 2.66 (or -0.32 SD) on system confidence. After this point, the effect of 
system confidence effect became negative (Figure 5). Results were similar when adjustment 
demographic variables were included the model (see the Supplement). No influential cases 
were identified (all &RRN¶VDs < .73).  
- Table 10 - 
- Figure 5 - 
Linear regression analysis with support for collective action as the outcome. We 
also conducted hierarchical regression analyses for general support for collective action. The 
linear effect was significant, B = -0.29, SE = 0.07ȕ -.25, p < .001, F(2, 257) = 17.10, p 
<.001, R2 = .06. The quadratic effect was negative but non-significant, B = -0.04, SE = 0.05, 
ȕ -.06, p =.35, F(2, 257) = 8.99, p <.001, R2 = .07, 'R2 = .003. The pattern of results 
remained similar when we included the adjustment variables in the model. No influential 
FDVHVZHUHLGHQWLILHGDOO&RRN¶VGLVWDQFHV27). 
Discussion 
Study 4 replicated the results of Study 3 with respect to actual political engagement: 
We observed a negative quadratic relationship between system confidence and participation 
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LQDWHDFKHUV¶XQLRQSURWHVW$OWKRXJKZHLGHQWLILHGDVLPLODUQHJDWLYHTXDGUDWLFUHODWLRQVKLS
between system confidence and general support for collective action, the latter effect did not 
reach statistical significance. Study 4 also examined the association between system 
confidence and the two types of political efficacy and need for change. In line with our 
theoretical rationale, system confidence was associated with low need for change but high 
external political efficacy, that is, DEHOLHILQWKHV\VWHPEHLQJUHVSRQVLYHWRRQH¶Vpolitical 
action. Collective efficacy, that is a belief in the effectiveness of the collective action, was 
unrelated to system confidence 
Study 5 
In Study 5 we sought to examine whether the curvilinear effect of system confidence 
on normative political engagement would replicate beyond the context of Poland (Studies 1-
4). To this end, we analyzed data from the World Value Survey, which includes questions 
about taking part in various forms of normative political engagement, such as collective 
action and voting. The survey also measures perceptions of the legitimacy of political 
institutions²which can serve as a proxy for system justifying tendencies (see e.g., Jost, 
Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). 
In addition, Study 5 investigated whether the individual-level link between system 
confidence and normative political engagement effect might depend on macro-level 
characteristics. One important factor that might moderate this relationship is the type of 
political regime. Democratic political regimes are relatively open to the articulations of 
FLWL]HQV¶GHPDQGV,QVXFKUHJLPHVSURWHVWDnd voting serve as conventional ways of 
participating in the political system and influencing political authorities (Norris, 2002). 
Nevertheless, individuals may still vary in their perceptions of how responsive the 
government is to such attempts. Non-democratic regimes, on the other hand, often preclude 
citizens from expressing their views and interests in the first place. In this class of political 
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systems, the individual costs of protest participation may be extremely high, including fines, 
detention, expulsion or the death penalty (Boudreau, 2004). Thus, democratic and non-
democratic political regimes create different opportunities for political engagement in 
collective action²ZKHUHDVWKHIRUPHUIDFLOLWDWHFLWL]HQV¶HQJDJHPHQWWKHODWWHUPLWLJDWHLW
(Dalton, van Sickle, & Weldon, 2010; Meyer, 2004; Welzel & Deutsch, 2012). Although 
other forms of political participation, such as voting, might be encouraged in nondemocratic 
regimes, they usually serve to show support for the authoritarian system rather than creating 
opportunities to express individual or collective interests and demands (see Gandhi & Lust-
Oskar, 2009). 
We propose that the divergent patterns of political opportunities inherent to 
democratic and non-democratic political regimes may affect the inverted U relationship 
between system confidence and political participation. Like other dispositions, system 
confidence constitutes a potential that can be differently realized depending on institutional 
factors (see van Zomeren, 2016). When the social system includes popular demonstrations 
and free elections as legitimate ways of participating in politics (as in full democracies), we 
are more likely to observe an inverted U relationship between system confidence and political 
engagement. We expected different patterns of results in non-democratic contexts. First, 
limited recognition or explicit disapproval of civic engagement specific to non-democratic 
polities should weaken the association between system confidence and collective action. In 
other words, we assume that differences in collective action participation will be more 
strongly predicted by system confidence in democratic as compared to non-democratic 
regimes. Second, because in non-democratic countries voting serves as an expression of 
regime support, we expected only a linear positive relationship between system confidence 
and voting in this context. 
Method 
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The following analyses combined data from five sources. We used individual level 
data on system confidence and political engagement from the 6th round of World Values 
Survey, the largest cross national study of values and beliefs that have ever been executed 
(WVS, 2015). We also used the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2010-2014), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016), the World Bank (WB, 2016) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2016) data for country characteristics such as regime type, human 
development and economic inequalities. The results presented below are based on data for 50 
countries, which had valid values on at least one of the dependent variables as well as all 
individual- and societal-level predictors.10 Because this dataset is publicly available, this 
study was exempt from research ethics committee approval. 
Participants. 
In the current analyses we utilized data from 71,007 adult participants, aged 18-99 (M
 
= 42.12, SD = 16.86). Women constituted 51.7% of the sample.  
Individual-level measures. 
System confidence. Following Brandt (2013), we estimated confidence in six societal 
institutions, namely WKHDUPHGIRUFHVWKHSROLFHWKHFRXUWVWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQQDWLRQ¶V
capital, the parliament and major companies (1 = a great deal, 2 = quite a lot, 3 = no very 
much, 4 = none at all). Participants¶ responses were recoded so that higher numbers reflected 
                                                        
10
 The full 6th round of World Values Survey covered 60 countries. For analyses focusing on 
collective action, we excluded data from 12 countries that lacked measures of collective 
action, confidence in armed forces, political conservatism, HDI, or Gini coefficients. For 
analyses focusing on voting, we excluded data from 11 countries that lacked measures of 
voting, confidence in armed forces, political conservatism, or Gini coefficients. For the 
precise lists of countries included in each of these analyses see the Supplement. Descriptive 
statistics were based on the data for 50 countries that were included in one or both of these 
analyses. Results for models based on larger data sets that omit individual- and societal-level 
adjustment variables confirm the negative quadratic effect (see the Supplement).  
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greater confidence in a given institution. The composite system confidence score was created 
by averaging the recoded responses (Įs from .54 to .91).  
Political engagement was operationalized as collective action participation and voting 
in national elections.  
Collective action was measured with four questions. Respondents indicated if they 
had undertaken various forms of normative political action (signing petition, joining boycotts, 
attending peaceful demonstration, joining strike).11 Three response options were available 
(1= have done, 2 = might do, 3 = would never do). Participants¶ answers were recoded so that 
higher numbers denoted higher engagement in a given form of protest. The average served as 
the index of collective action (Įs ranging from .49 to .92).  
Voting in national-level elections was assessed with a single question.12 Respondents 
were asked to report how often they participated in elections (1 = always, 2 = usually, 3 = 
never).  Prior to analyses, the responses were recoded so that higher values reflected more 
frequent voting.  
Adjustment variables. Education was assessed by asking respondents to indicate the 
highest educational level they had attained (1 = no formal education, 9 = university-level 
education, with degree,WHPÄ,QSROLWLFDOPDWWHUVSHRSOHWDONRI³WKHOHIW´DQG³WKHULJKW´
How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking"´ left, 10 = right) 
served as the measure of political conservatism. Other individual-level covariates were 
gender (-.50 = male, .50 = female) and age. 
Societal-level measures. 
                                                        
11
 Beyond items comprising the current index, the questionnaire used in the 6th round of 
WVS asked respondents to indicate if they had participated in any other type of collective 
action. Because Study 5 focused on normative engagement, we decided not to include the 
latter item in the composite score for collective action.   
12
 Respondents were also asked to indicate how often they participated in elections at the 
local level. However, because our system confidence measure involved trust in national-level 
institutions, we omitted participation in local elections from our analyses.   
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Regime type.  For FRXQWULHV¶UHJLPHW\SHZHXVHGIRXU categories (1 = authoritarian 
regime, 2 = hybrid regime, 3 = flawed democracy, 4 = full democracy) generated by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit on the basis of Democracy Index ± the state of democracy 
measure, which covers five areas of polities functioning (e.g. electoral process and pluralism, 
civil liberties, political participation, political culture and the functioning of government; 
EIU, 2015) and has been employed in prior cross-cultural research (e.g., Ellenbroek, 
Verkuyten, Thijs, & Poppe, 2014). The final sample of countries included 8 authoritarian 
regimes, 10 hybrid regimes, 20 flawed democracies and 10 full democracies. 
Gini coefficient. The World Bank (WB, 2016) and Central Intelligence Unit (CIA, 
HVWLPDWHVRI*LQLFRHIILFLHQWUHIOHFWHGWKHFRXQWULHV¶H[WHQWRILQFRPHLQHTXDOLWLHV7KH
index could take values from 0 (=perfect equality) to 100 (=perfect inequality).  
Human development was measured with United Nations Human Development Index 
(HDI; UNDP, 2016) which takes into account three key dimensions: long and healthy life 
(assessed by life expectancy at birth), knowledge (assessed indices of schooling) and the 
decent standard of living (assessed as gross national income per capita). In the current 
sample, HDI values ranged from 0.474 to 0.932 with higher values indicating higher level of 
human development. Where possible, the values of all societal-level variables matched the 
year of WVS administration in a given country.13  
Descriptive statistics for all individual- and societal level variables are presented in 
Table 11. 
Analytic strategy. Due to the two-level structure of the data (individuals nested 
within countries), we employed multi-level modeling (Hox, 2010) to verify our hypotheses. 
Two series of multi-level regression models with collective action and voting as the 
                                                        
13
 Exact scores, sources and years of measurement for political regime, HDI and Gini 
coefficient are available in the Supplement.  
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dependent variables were performed using maximum likelihood estimator with robust 
standard errors (MLR) . The analyses proceeded in the sequence of five steps. First, we 
estimated an intercept-only model (Model 1), which permitted political engagement 
intercepts to vary between the countries. This solution allowed for determining what part of 
variation in UHVSRQGHQWV¶FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQor voting occurred at the individual- and the 
societal-level of analysis. Because a large proportion of variance at the societal-level justifies 
using multi-level modeling instead of OLS regression, Model 1 results were critical for 
determining subsequent analyses. Next, we added the random slopes for the two system 
confidence terms: linear in Model 2 and then quadratic in Model 3. The results of Model 3, 
testing the quadratic effect of system confidence in the full sample, were crucial to examine 
the universality of the inverted U relationship between system confidence and normative 
political engagement. In Model 4 we added individual-level adjustment variables (i.e. gender, 
age, education and political conservatism). In this solution, all individual-level effects were 
fixed. In Model 5, collective action or voting were additionally regressed on societal-level 
variables, i.e. political regime, HDI and Gini coefficient. Furthermore, in order to examine if 
the type of political regime moderated the relationship between system confidence and 
collective action, we regressed the two dependent variables on the two cross-level 
interactions of political regime with the random slopes for linear and the quadratic terms for 
system confidence. The fit of subsequent models was assessed on the basis of the deviance 
statistic.  
Prior to performing multilevel models, both individual- and societal-level predictors 
were centered to the grand-mean. Appropriate centering of individual-level predictors is 
crucial for the interpretation of the results and should be linked to substantive research 
questions (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Because both our hypotheses referred to the absolute 
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OHYHORIUHVSRQGHQWV¶V\VWHPconfidence, rather than their relative position within a particular 
society, grand mean centering was more appropriate than group mean centering.  
The rate of missing values for individual-level variables ranged from 0.1% for gender 
and age to 16.0% for political conservatism. To account for the missing data, we employed 
multiple imputation technique (Enders, 2010) with the total of 20 imputed datasets.14 All 
computations were performed in Mplus (Version 7.4; Muthén & Muthén, 2012).  
Results 
Bivariate analyses. Correlations for individual- and societal-level continuous 
variables are presented in Table 11. The two types of normative political engagement²
voting and collective action, were positively correlated. System confidence was correlated 
with voting intentions, but not with collective action. Political conservatism was positively 
linked to voting, but negatively to collective action. Gender differentiated collective action, 
t(65923.45) = 21.02, p < .001, d = 0.16, 95% CI [0.15, 0.18], voting, t(68,100.65) = 3.39, p = 
.001 , d = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.04], and system confidence, t(70405) = -5.28 , p < .001, d = 
0.04, 95% CI [0.03, 0.05]. In comparison to women, men manifested higher collective action 
participation (Mmen = 1.59, SDmen = 0.57 vs. Mwomen = 1.50, SDwomen = 0.54), higher voting 
participation (Mmen = 2.46, SDmen = 0.74 vs. Mwomen = 2.44, SDwomen = 0.75), and lower system 
confidence (Mmen = 2.48, SDmen = 0.67 vs. Mwomen = 2.51, SDwomen = 0.67).  
- Table 11 - 
Multi-level analyses with collective action as the outcome. Table 12 presents the 
results of five multi-level regression models with collective action as the dependent variable. 
The results of intercept-only Model 1 indicated that both individual- and societal-level 
variance were significantly larger than 0. At the same time, almost 21% of collective action 
                                                        
14
 When we did not impute the missing data the results remained similar (see the 
Supplement).  
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variability was explained by the differences between the countries, ICC = .21, 95% CI [.14, 
.27], p < .001.  Thus, the multilevel analysis of the current data was justified.  
Model 2 included the random slope for the linear effect of system confidence. On 
average, system confidence was not related to collective action in a linear fashion, B = -0.01, 
SE = 0.01, Z = -0.80, p = .422. However, societal-level variance in the linear effect of system 
confidence was greater than 0, which signifies substantial variability among countries.   
In Model 3 we added the random slope for the quadratic effect of system confidence. 
In line with the results of Studies 1-4, the average quadratic effect of system confidence was 
negative and significant, B = -0.04, SE = 0.01, Z = -5.38, p < .001. On average, system 
confidence increased collective action only to the certain point (2.35 or -0.19 SD), after 
which its effect became negative. Nevertheless, the societal-level variance in the quadratic 
effect of system confidence differed from 0, which suggested that the curvilinear relationship 
between system confidence and collective action might depend on the properties of particular 
countries, such as the type of political regime.  
Model 4 aimed to investigate if the curvilinear effect of system confidence on 
collective action was independent from the effects of individual-level adjustment variables 
such as gender, age, education and political conservatism. Adding adjustment variables into 
the equation did not change the significance of either quadratic, B = -0.03, SE = 0.01, Z = -
4.40, p < .001, or linear, B = -0.003, SE = 0.01, Z = -0.27, p = .785, effects of system 
confidence on collective action.  
Model 5 tested the direct effects of political regime, human development and 
inequalities as well as two cross-level interactions between political regime and system 
confidence. We operationalized political regime as the dichotomous variable where full 
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democracies were coded as 1, and other systems as 0.15 The effect of political regime was 
positive, B= 0.35, SE = 0.09, Z = 4.01, p < .001, indicating that respondents living in full 
democracies reported higher collective action as compared to individuals living in other 
systems. Economic inequalities of a given country were associated with higher collective 
action, B = 0.01, SE = 0.003, Z = 2.39, p = .017, while human development had a marginal 
association with collective action, B = 0.37, SE = 0.21, Z = 1.80, p = .073. The cross-level 
interaction between political regime and the linear term for system confidence was 
nonsignificant, B = -0.02, SE = 0.02, Z = -0.81, p = .421. However, political regime interacted 
with the quadratic term for system confidence, B = -0.05, SE = 0.02, Z = -3.62, p < .001. In 
line with our predictions, the curvilinear relationship between system confidence and 
collective action was more strongly pronounced in full democracies, B= -0.08, SE = 0.01, Z = 
-6.05, p < .001, than other types of polities, B= -0.02, SE = 0.01, Z = -2.78, p = .005 (see 
Figure 6). 
- Table 12 - 
- Figure 6 - 
Multi-level analyses with voting as the outcome. Next, we repeated the same steps 
for voting in the national elections as the dependent variable. Table 13 presents the results of 
five multilevel ordered logit models. The results of intercept-only Model 1 indicated that 
almost 21% of voting variability was explained by the differences between the countries, ICC 
= .21, 95% CI [.14, .28], p < .001, justifying the multilevel analysis of the current data. 
As indicated by the results of Model 2, the random slope for system confidence was 
positive and significant, B = 0.42, SE = 0.05, Z = 9.18, p < .001. Model 3 revealed the 
                                                        
15
 We also examined models in which the type of political regime was dummy-coded (see the 
Supplement). This analysis suggested that authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes and flawed 
democracies did not differ with respect to the relationship between political engagement and 
system confidence. Therefore, we decided to collapse these categories in the current analysis.   
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negative and marginally significant random slope for the quadratic effect of system 
confidence on voting, B = -0.06, SE = 0.03, Z = -1.86, p = .063 (with the inflection point 
falling outside the range of system confidence values, 5.83 or 4.98 SDs). Although marginal, 
this effect corroborated the results of analyses conduced for collective action as the 
dependent variable. In Model 4, which included the individual-level adjustment variables, the 
random slope for the quadratic effect of system confidence remained negative and significant, 
B = -0.07, SE = 0.03, Z = -2.20, p = .028. Importantly, the societal-level variance in the 
quadratic effect of system confidence was significant, suggesting that the curvilinear 
relationship between system confidence and voting might depend on the type of political 
regime.  
Therefore, in Model 5 we checked whether the type of political regime moderated the 
relationship between system confidence and voting. Furthermore, we adjusted for each 
FRXQWU\¶V degree of economic inequality and human development. As shown in Table 13, the 
dependent variable was not predicted by HDI, B = 0.26, SE = 1.41, Z = 0.19, p = .852. The 
positive effects of political regime, B = 0.81, SE = 0.44, Z = 1.83, p = .067, and Gini 
coefficient, B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, Z = 1.76, p = .078, were only marginally significant. We 
found a significant cross-level interaction between political regime and the linear term for 
system confidence, B = 0.27, SE = 0.08, Z = 3.25, p = .001, indicating that the positive 
relationship between system confidence and voting was stronger in full democracies, B = 
0.57, SE = 0.07, Z = 8.09, p < .001, than in other types of regimes, B = 0.30, SE = 0.05, Z = 
6.10, p < .001. Crucially, we also found a significant negative interaction between the 
political regime and the quadratic term for system confidence, B = -0.26, SE = 0.09, Z = -
2.99, p = .001. Similarly to results obtained for collective action as the dependent variable, 
the curvilinear relationship between system confidence and voting was stronger in full 
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democracies, B= -0.27, SE = 0.08, Z = -3.34, p = .001, than other types of polities, B= -0.02, 
SE = 0.03, Z = -0.60, p = .550.  
- Table 13 - 
Discussion 
Study 5 confirmed the curvilinear relationship between system confidence and 
political engagement in the form of normative collective action and voting across 48 and 49 
world countries, respectively. This effect was present even after adjusting for a variety of 
individual-level characteristics (i.e., gender, age, education or political conservatism) as well 
as macro-level factors, including levels of inequality and development, as well as the regime 
type. Furthermore, Study 5 demonstrated that the curvilinear effect of system confidence on 
collective action depended on the type of political regime. As expected, the inverted U 
relationships between system confidence and both forms of political engagement were more 
pronounced in fully democratic countries, compared to non-democratic regimes.  
Thus, the present results demonstrate that, in contrast to non-democratic polities, fully 
democratic systems create the setting that highlights the effects of system justification. This 
is line with past research showing the impact of democratic vs. non-democratic institutional 
arrangements on the psychological processes leading to political engagement. For example, 
Dalton and colleagues (2010) showed that the positive effect of post-materialist values on 
collective action was stronger in more politically open (i.e. more democratic) countries. A 
study by Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young (2011) revealed that in countries with longer 
democratic traditions efficacy exerted stronger positive effect on collective engagement. The 
current Study 5 demonstrated a similar pattern for system justification as the individual-level 
predictor, highlighting the importance of context in understanding political engagement (see 
also van Zomeren, 2016). 
General Discussion 
 
Running head: SYSTEM CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT                  39 
 
Across five survey and field studies we demonstrated a negative quadratic relationship 
between system confidence and political engagement. The effect was obtained for various 
forms of political engagement. These included intentions to vote (Studies 1 and 5) and 
engage in normative collective action (Studies 2, 3 and 5), as well as actual political 
behavior, such as participation in political demonstrations (Studies 3 and 4). A similar pattern 
of results was observed for confidence in the system of gender relations as well as both 
national and international (European) systems. In all cases, at relatively low levels system 
confidence was positively related to political engagement, but at its higher levels system 
confidence was negatively related to political engagement. In other words, political 
engagement was highest at intermediate levels of system confidence. This curvilinear effect 
was observed in Poland (Studies 1-4), and conceptually replicated in 50 countries using data 
from the World Values Survey (Study 5). 
Previous studies examining linear relationships between system confidence and 
normative political engagement yielded mixed results (for a review see Cichocka & Jost, 
2014). Likewise, in the research reported here we found the linear effect of system 
confidence to be inconsistent: It was positive for intentions to vote in Studies 1 and 5, 
negative for collective action in Studies 3-4, and nonsignificant for collective action in 
Studies 2 and 5. The present studies suggest that a curvilinear relationship better captures the 
nature of the link between system confidence and normative political engagement (see also 
Grant & Schwartz, 2011).  
We propose that the inverted U pattern we observed might be the result of two 
opposing processes. On one hand, system confidence might undermine political engagement 
to the extent that it involves little or no desire for social change. On the other hand, system 
confidence might strengthen political engagement to the extent that it carries with it the 
conviction that system-level authorities are responsive to FLWL]HQV¶political efforts (Cichocka 
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& Jost, 2014). In terms of system justification theory, the more people justify the system, the 
more confidence they should have in their ability to influence the system, but, at the same 
time they should place less value on changing it. Indeed, in Study 4 system confidence was 
positively associated with external political efficacy, that is, a belief that the system is 
UHVSRQVLYHWRRQH¶VSROLWLFDOHIIRUWVand negatively associated with the need to change the 
status quo. This suggests that system confidence incorporates both of these factors and helps 
to explain why a curvilinear pattern characterizes the relationship between system confidence 
and normative political engagement, with greatest engagement at intermediate levels of 
system confidence.  
The precise shape of the curve seems to vary depending upon the type of normative 
political engagement. The inflection point showing the maximum likelihood of political 
participation was observed for higher levels of system confidence in the case of voting, in 
comparison with collective action (compare, for instance, Figures 2 and 3). It could be that 
feelings of external efficacy play a more important role in encouraging voting, whereas desire 
for social change plays a more important role in stimulating protest behaviour. These 
differences also suggest that the relationship between system confidence and political 
engagement does not always obey a perfect inverted U-shape. Depending upon the societal 
context and the type of engagement, the curve might be steeper on one side than on the other. 
For instance, we would speculate that the inflection point would be higher (in terms of 
system confidence) for those engaging in system-supporting protests (i.e., demonstrating 
against proposed changes, which may be more strongly driven by faith in the system¶V 
responsiveness) than for those engaging in system-challenging protests (i.e., demanding 
changes to the status quo, which might be more strongly driven by the desire for change; see 
Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017; Tilly, 1976). By the same token, we would also 
expect the inflection point to be higher for those supporting incumbent and/or politically 
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conservative causes than for those supporting challengers and/or more progressive causes.16 
Future research is needed to specify the conditions that affect the shape of the negative 
quadratic relationship between system confidence and political engagement.   
In determining the precise shape of the curve, future research would also benefit from 
directly measuring the values of system responsiveness and desire for change.  Our model of 
political engagement suggests that these combine multiplicatively to drive political 
engagement. As either variable approaches zero, so does their product, and the likelihood of 
political engagement follows. Thus, our model would predict that in societal contexts in 
which few, if any, citizens perceive a strong need for change, the value of the product will 
not decline steeply from the inflection point on the right side of the curve. In contexts in 
which few, if any, citizens see the system as completely unresponsive, the value of the 
product will not decline steeply from the inflection point on the left side of the curve. In 
Study 4 we were able to explore some of these details, and we observed the hypothesized 
relations between system confidence and high external efficacy and low desire for change. 
However, the current data sets do not provide a definitive test of whether the two processes 
are capable of explaining the quadratic effect. Future research should employ experimental 
methods to facilitate the drawing of causal inferences and to investigate the interactive effects 
                                                        
16
 In Study 1, we obtained information about specific voting intentions. At the time the study 
was conducted, the incumbent leadership was a relatively progressive coalition (Civic 
Platform with the smaller Polish 3HRSOH¶V3DUW\and the largest of the challenging parties 
was conservative (Law and Justice). We conducted a multinomial logistic regression to 
compare voting for the Civic Platform party (vs. not voting) and voting for the Law and 
Justice party (vs. not voting). We observed a significant negative quadratic effect of system 
confidence on voting for the incumbent. The inflection point was relatively high in terms of 
system confidence, which is consistent with the notion that perceptions of system 
responsiveness would play a strong role in predicting incumbent support. At the same time, 
the quadratic effect suggests that support for the incumbent was also motivated by desire for 
change. We observed a weak negative quadratic effect for voting for the challenger, but this 
effect was only marginally significant (see Supplemental materials for details and for similar 
analyses including other incumbent and challenging parties). 
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of system responsiveness and desire for change.  Ideally, these variables would be 
experimentally manipulated, and so, too, would system justification motivation.   
We did not detect a quadratic relationship between system confidence and non-
normative political engagement, such as insurgent activity that violates the legal code of the 
system (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). We hypothesised that support for non-
normative collective action would be strongest when levels of disappointment with the 
system are extremely high. In support of this conjecture, we did observe in Study 4 that there 
was a negative linear effect of system confidence on non-normative collective action 
intentions (for a related finding, see Jost et al., 2012). This effect became non-significant 
once we adjusted for demographic variables and political orientation. It is conceivable that 
the concomitants of extremely low levels of system confidence would be better captured by 
measuring actual participation in non-normative collective action, as opposed to declarations 
of intention. Although there may be legal and ethical challenges in examining disruptive, 
non-normative political behaviour LQWKH³UHDOZRUOG,´ we hope that future research considers 
the implications of our research for that type of political activism. 
Our findings shed light on the role of macro-level (as well as micro-level) factors 
involved in political engagement (van Zomeren, 2016). In Study 5 we discovered that the 
curvilinear effect of system confidence on political engagement depended upon the type of 
political regime. As expected, the strength of the inverted U relationship between system 
confidence and normative political engagement was more pronounced in fully democratic 
regimes, as compared to less democratic regimes. It seems that, in contrast to authoritarian 
polities, democratic systems foster a curvilinear relationship between system confidence and 
civic engagement. Thus, our research program demonstrates that normative collective action 
obeys the Lewinian formula that combines personal dispositions and elements of the social 
context.  
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Taking into account interactions between personal and situational variables is crucial 
for the study of political psychological processes. To date, the institutional determinants of 
collective action have rarely been considered in the social psychological literature (cf. 
Corcoran et al., 2011; but see Jost et al., 2017). Focusing exclusively on micro- (individual) 
and meso- (group) levels of analysis, explanations of collective action in social and 
personality psychology often neglect macro-level factors, making tacit claims for universal 
applicability. At the same time, research in sociology and political science demonstrates that 
participation in collective action is moderated by properties of the social system (Dalton et 
al., 2010; Welzel & Deutsch, 2012). Political systems ranging from authoritarian regimes to 
advanced industrial democracies create very different opportunities for collective action, 
which means that different types of personal qualities may predict political participation in 
different contexts (Norris, 2002; Tarrow, 1994). The same individual disposition may foster 
political engagement in one country and have negligible effects in another (Dalton et al. 
2010). Taken in conjunction with comparative studies (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2011), the 
findings from our last study suggest that researchers should treat the investigation of 
contextual effects as a necessary part of understanding political engagement.  
Our results point to the conclusion that some²presumably, moderate²degree of 
confidence in the socio-political system is useful for stimulating political participation. When 
citizens possess very low levels of system confidence, they may desire social change, but 
they may also experience a form of alienation and therefore disengage from political or civic 
activism. Conversely, when citizens possess very high levels of system confidence, they may 
regard authority figures as relatively open and receptive to their wishes, but they are unlikely 
to place much value on accomplishing social change. Future research is needed to specify the 
optimal level of system confidence that will stimulate social change without increasing 
ideological subjugation to the system, especially when it comes to members of disadvantaged 
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social groups. In the meantime, our findings may prove useful to those who are working in 
the public sector to promote civic engagement in democratic social systems. As President 
Obama noted in his 2016 VSHHFK³Change is the effort of committed citizens who hitch their 
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Table 1 
Zero-Order Correlations among Continuous and Ordinal Variables (Study 1) 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Voting intentions     
2. System confidence .13***    
3. Age .03 -.07*   
4. Education .18*** .05 -.40***  
5. Political conservatism .14*** .02 .03 .05 
Note. To compute correlations for the voting LQWHQWLRQVZHXVHG6SHDUPDQ¶Vȡ$OO
FRUUHODWLRQVIRUWKHFRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOHVDUH3HDUVRQ¶Vr. 
* p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions (Study 1)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Group and predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI B OR OR 95% CI 
,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
      
Intercept 0.11   0.38**   
System confidence 0.36*** 1.43 [1.16, 1.77] 0.53*** 1.71 [1.36, 2.16] 
 System confidence2    -0.34*** 0.71 [0.59, 0.86] 
I would participate 
      
Intercept 0.73***   0.89***   
System confidence 0.41*** 1.51 [1.25, 1.82] 0.49*** 1.63 [1.34, 1.99] 
System confidence2    -0.18* 0.84 [0.72, 0.97] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .02 .04 
-2 log-likelihood  152.52 139.55 
Note. '9¶VFDWHJRU\RIUHIHUHQFH ³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´6\VWHPconfidence was mean-centered prior to the analyses.  
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 3 
Zero-Order Correlations among Continuous Variables (Study 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Collective action intentions      
2. System confidence -.01     
3. Attitudes toward the out-group .33*** .03    
4. Age .02 -.09** .01   
5. Education .03 .03 .13*** -.30***  
6. Political conservatism .10** -.08* .04 .06 -.04 
Note.  p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Results of Linear Regression Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action Intentions (Study 2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 3.68***  [3.55, 3.80] 3.78***  [3.63, 3.94] 
Attitudes toward the out-group  0.55*** .34 [0.45, 0.65] 0.56*** .34 [0.46, 0.66] 
System confidence -0.04 -.03 [-0.13, 0.05] -0.05 -.03 [-0.14, 0.04] 
System confidence2    -0.06* -.07 [-0.11, -0.01] 
R2 .11 .12 
F F(2, 921) = 58.08*** F(3, 920) = 40.57*** 
'R2  .01 
'F  F(1, 920) = 5.04*** 
Note. All predictors were mean-centered prior to the analysis.  
* p < .05. *** p < .001.  
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Table 5 
Zero-Order Correlations among Continuous Variables (Study 3)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Support for collective action        
1. Normative collective action intentions .59***       
2. Non-normative collective action intentions .23*** .23***      
4. Gender system confidence -.33*** -.36*** -.16*     
5. Age -.04 -.08 -.11 .03    
6. Education .07 .05 .05 -.21*** .04   
7. Social conservatism -.30*** -.23*** -.09 .43*** .07 -.15*  
8. Economic conservatism -.18** -.30*** -.25*** .37*** .03 -.12 .24*** 
Note.  p < .10.  * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 6 
Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI B OR OR 95% CI 
Intercept 0.80*** 2.23  1.08*** 2.94  
Gender system confidence -0.73*** 0.48 [0.35, 0.67] -0.63*** 0.54 [0.38, 0.75] 
Gender system confidence2    -0.42** 0.66 [0.48, 0.90] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .11 .15 
-2 log-likelihood 301.73 293.65 
Note. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to the analyses.  
** p < .01. *** p < .001.   
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Table 7 
Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Support for Collective Action (Study 3)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 6.28***   6.47***  [6.33, 6.61] 
Gender system confidence -0.42*** -0.36 [-0.55, -0.29] -0.35*** -.29 [-0.48, -0.21] 
Gender system confidence2    -0.25*** -.29 [-0.35, -0.15] 
R2 .13 .20 
F F(1, 254) = 36.54*** F(2, 253) = 32.42*** 
'R2  .08 
'F  F(1, 253) = 24.87*** 
Note. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to the analyses. Influential case excluded.  
*** p < .001.
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Table 8 
Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Normative and Non-normative Collective Actions Intentions (Study 3) 
 Normative Collective Action Intentions  Non-normative Collective Action Intentions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor 
variable 
B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 5.80***  [5.65, 5.96] 5.90***  [5.71, 6.08] 2.53  [2.32, 2.74]   [2.24, 2.73] 
Gender system 
confidence 
-0.58*** -0.38 [-0.76, -0.41] -0.54*** -.35 [-0.72, -0.36] -0.32** -.16 [-0.54, -0.08] -0.34** -.18 [-0.59, -0.09] 
Gender system 
confidence2 
   
-0.13+ -.11 [-0.26, 0.003]    0.05 .04 [-0.11, 0.21] 
R2 .14 .16 .03 .03 
F F(1, 254) = 42.78*** F(2, 253) = 23.48*** F(1, 255) = 7.07** F(2, 254) = 3.73* 
'R2 
 .01  .002 
'F 
 F(1, 253) = 3.72  F(1, 254) = .40 
Note. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to the analyses. Influential case excluded.  
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
 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 9 
Zero-Order Correlations among Continuous Variables (Study 4) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6XSSRUWIRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ        
([WHUQDOSROLWLFDOHIILFDF\ 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Note.  p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 10 
Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration (Study 4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI B OR OR 95% CI 
Intercept 1.78*** 5.90  2.07*** 13.33  
System confidence -0.32 0.73 [0.50, 1.06] -0.23 0.79 [0.56, 1.12] 
System confidence2    -0.34* 0.71 [0.54, 0.95] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .02 .06 
-2 log-likelihood 229.08 222.60 
Note. System confidence was mean-centered prior to the analyses.  

 p < .10. * p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Individual- and Societal-level Variables (Study 5) 
 
Individual-level variables N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Collective action 66,626 1.55 0.56      
2. Voting  68,367 2.45 0.75 .12***     
3. System confidence 70,438 2.50 0.67 -.003 .08***    
4. Political conservatism 59,086 5.72 2.29 -.11*** .03*** .12***   
5. Education 70,240 5.61 2.35 .19*** .04*** -.02*** -.04***  
6. Age 70,989 42.10 16.86 -.01** .25*** .03*** .01** -.17*** 
Societal-level variables N M SD 7 8    
7. Political regime type 50 2.56 1.05      
8. Human Development Index 50 0.75 0.12 .67***     
9. Gini coefficient 50 37.75 9.36 .05 -.25    




 p < .10. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 12 
Individual-level and Societal-level Predictors of Collective Action Participation (Study 5) 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 1.55 (0.04)*** 1.55 (0.04)*** 1.57 (0.04)*** 1.57 (0.04)*** 1.50 (0.04)*** 
Individual level (IL) effects      
System confidence   -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 0.001 (0.013) 
System confidence2   -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.008)** 
Gender     -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** 
Age (10 years)    -0.06 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) 
Education     0.04 (0.004)*** 0.04 (0.004)*** 
Political conservatism    -0.02 (0.003)*** -0.02 (0.003)*** 
Societal level (SL) effects      
Political regime type     0.35 (0.09)*** 
Gini     0.01 (0.003)* 
Human Development Index     0.37 (0.21) 
Cross-level interactions      
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System confidence u Political regime type     -0.02 (0.02) 
System confidence2 u Political regime type     -0.05 (0.02)*** 
Variance         
IL variation of the DV 0.25 (0.01)*** 0.25 (0.01)*** 0.25 (0.01)*** 0.23 (0.01)*** 0.23 (0.01)*** 
SL variation of the DV 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07(0.01) 0.04 (0.01)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of system 
confidence 
 0.01 (0.002)*** 0.01 (0.002)*** 0.01 (0.001)*** 0.01 (0.001)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of system 
confidence2 
  0.002 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.000)** 
-2 log-likelihood 98746.21 98040.49 97809.80 94175.26 94144.27 
Note. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other 
systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized 
coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets). 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 13 
Individual-level and Societal-level Predictors of Voting in National Elections (Study 5) 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Individual level (IL) effects      
System confidence   0.42 (0.05)***  0.40 (0.04)*** 0.36 (0.05)*** 0.30 (0.05)*** 
System confidence2   -0.06 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03)* -0.02 (0.03) 
Gender     -0.09 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.04)* 
Age (10 years)    0.36 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 
Education     0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 
Political conservatism    0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Societal level (SL) effects      
Political regime type     0.81 (0.44) 
Gini     0.02 (0.01) 
Human Development Index     0.26 (1.41) 
Cross-level interactions      
System confidence u political regime type     0.27 (0.08)** 
Running head: SYSTEM CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT                  70 
 
System confidence2 u Political regime type     -0.26 (0.09)** 
Tresholds      
Cut 1 -1.99 (0.14)*** -1.99 (0.08)*** -2.00 (0.06)*** -2.17 (0.07)*** -1.90 (0.16)*** 
Cut 2 -0.59 (0.14)*** -0.56 (0.07)*** -0.56 (0.04)*** -0.66 (0.07)*** -0.39 (0.16)* 
Variance         
SL variation of the DV 0.87 (0.19)*** 0.93 (0.20)*** 0.98 (0.21)*** 0.90 (0.19)*** 0.80 (0.15)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of System 
confidence 
 0.10 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of System 
confidence2 
  0.04 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)*** 
-2 loglikelihood 119421.71 118145.82 118057.61 113988.98 113969.99 
Note. '9¶VFDWHJRU\RIUHIHUHQFH ³1HYHU´Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 
for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean-centered prior to conducting 
analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 
imputed datasets). 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 






Figure 1. Theoretical model illustrating the curvilinear relationship between system 
confidence and political engagement. The model assumes that system confidence is the 
subspace where system confidence is negatively associated with need for change and 
positively associated with external efficacy (dashed arrow), and that political engagement is a 
product of need for change and external efficacy (surface shown). 
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Figure 2. Voting intentions (odds of rHVSRQGLQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´³,ZRXOGSDUWLFLSDWH´
UHODWLYHWR³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´ZLWKUHVSHFWWRXSFRPLQJHOHFWLRQV) as a function of 
system confidence (Study 1).
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Figure 3. Solidarity-based collective action intentions as a function of system confidence 
(Study 2). Data plotted for average attitudes toward the out-group. 
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Figure 4. Probability of protest participation as a function of gender system confidence 
(Study 3). For gender system confidence values higher than 6.38 the plot was extrapolated. 
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Figure 5. Probability of protest participation as a function of system confidence (Study 4). 
For system confidence values higher than 6.75 the plot was extrapolated.
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Figure 6. Collective action participation as a function of system confidence and political 
regime (Study 5). All individual and societal-level adjustment variables equal to 0. 





Results of an Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions (Study 1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor variable B 95% CI B  95% CI B 95% CI 
System confidence 0.28*** [0.14, 0.41] 0.33*** [0.18, 0.48] 0.32*** [0.16, 0.47] 
 System confidence2   -0.09 [-0.20, 0.03] -0.08 [-0.20, 0.04] 
Gender      -0.28* [-0.53, -0.04] 
Age     1.56*** [0.80, 2.33] 
Education     0.14*** [0.09, 0.18] 
Political conservatism     0.23*** [0.12, 0.34] 
Thresholds       
Cut 1 -1.14*** [-1.28, -0.99] -1.21*** [-1.39, -1.03] -1.30*** [-1.48, -1.11] 
Cut2 0.04 [-0.09, 0.17] -0.03 [-0.19, 0.13] -0.05 [-0.22, 0.11] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .02 .02 .10 
-2 log-likelihood  157.11 154.93 1877.91 
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Parallel slopes assumption test F2(1) = 5.78* F2(2) = 14.74*** F2(6) = 31.75*** 
Note. All continuous predictors were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.  
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 




Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions with Adjustment Variables (Study 1)  
Group and predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI 
,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
   
Intercept 0.38   
System confidence 0.52*** 1.67 [1.33, 2.11] 
 System confidence2 -0.33*** 0.72 [0.60, 0.87] 
Gender  0.10 1.10 [0.76, 1.59] 
Age -1.10 0.33 [0.11, 1.05] 
Education 0.01 1.01 [0.95, 1.08] 
Political conservatism 0.14 1.15 [0.97, 1.36] 
I would participate 
   
Intercept 0.91***   
System confidence 0.48*** 1.62 [1.32, 1.99] 
System confidence2 -0.17* 0.85 [0.73, 0.99] 
Gender   -0.30 0.74 [0.53, 1.03] 
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Age 1.51** 4.54 [1.61, 12.79] 
Education 0.16*** 1.17 [1.11, 1.24] 
Political conservatism 0.28*** 1.32 [1.14, 1.53] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .13 
-2 log-likelihood  1848.76 
Note. '9¶VFDWHJRU\RIUHIHUHQFH ³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´6\VWHPconfidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered 
prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100. 
 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions for Law and Justice (Challenger) and Civic Platform (Incumbent) 
with Adjustment Variables (Study 1)  
Group and predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI 
,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
   
Intercept 0.40**   
System confidence 0.52*** 1.68 [1.33, 2.13] 
 System confidence2 -0.34*** 0.71 [0.59, 0.86] 
Gender  0.10 1.10 [0.76, 1.60] 
Age -1.06 0.35 [0.11, 1.08] 
Education 0.02 1.02 [0.96, 1.09] 
Political conservatism 0.17+ 1.19 [0.98, 1.45] 
Challenger 
   
Intercept -1.20***   
System confidence 0.28 1.32 [0.92, 1.88] 
System confidence2 -0.29+ 0.75 [0.56, 1.00] 
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Gender   -0.27 0.76 [0.44, 1.33] 
Age 2.07* 7.96 [1.38, 45.89] 
Education 0.13** 1.14 [1.04, 1.25] 
Political conservatism 1.11*** 3.05 [2.38, 3.90] 
Incumbent    
Intercept -.13   
System confidence 0.74*** 2.09 [1.58, 2.75] 
System confidence2 -0.24* 0.79 [0.65, 0.95] 
Gender   -0.49* 0.61 [0.40, 0.94] 
Age 1.14 3.12 [0.85, 11.48] 
Education 0.22*** 1.24 [1.15, 1.33] 
Political conservatism 0.37*** 1.45 [1.17, 1.81] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .28 
-2 log-likelihood  1716.02 
Note. '9¶VFDWHJRU\RIUHIHUHQFH ³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´6\VWHPconfidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered 
prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.  p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Figure S1. Voting intentions (odds of UHVSRQGLQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´YRWLQJIRUDFKDOOHnger (Law and Justice)/incumbent (Civic Platform) political 
party UHODWLYHWRUHVSRQGLQJ³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´ZLWKUHVSHFWWRXSFRPLQJHOHFWLRQV as a function of system confidence (Study 1). 
 
 




Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions for Challenging and Incumbent Parties with Adjustment Variables 
(Study 1)  
Group and predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI 
,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
   
Intercept 0.39**   
System confidence 0.52*** 1.69 [1.34, 2.13] 
 System confidence2 -0.33*** 0.72 [0.59, 0.87] 
Gender  0.10 1.11 [0.76, 1.60] 
Age -1.08 0.34 [0.11, 1.06] 
Education 0.02 1.02 [0.96, 1.09] 
Political conservatism 0.13 1.13 [0.96, 1.34] 
Challenger parties 
   
Intercept -0.20   
System confidence 0.29* 1.33 [1.03, 1.73] 
System confidence2 -0.15 0.86 [0.71, 1.05] 
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Gender   -0.32 0.72 [0.48, 1.10] 
Age 2.45*** 11.55 [3.19, 41.84] 
Education 0.18*** 1.20 [1.12, 1.29] 
Political conservatism 0.32*** 1.37 [1.15, 1.63] 
Incumbent parties    
Intercept -.001   
System confidence 0.77*** 2.15 [1.65, 2.80] 
System confidence2 -0.23* 0.80 [0.66, 0.95] 
Gender   -0.56** 0.57 [0.38, 0.86] 
Age 1.17 3.23 [0.94, 11.14] 
Education 0.19*** 1.21 [1.13, 1.30] 
Political conservatism 0.25** 1.29 [1.08, 1.53] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .18 
-2 log-likelihood  2137.34 
Note. '9¶VFDWHJRU\RIUHIHUHQFH ³,ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´6\VWHPconfidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered 
prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.  p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Figure S2. Voting intentions (odds of respondiQJ³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´YRWLQJIRU challenger/LQFXPEHQWSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVUHODWLYHWRUHVSRQGLQJ³,
ZRXOGQRWSDUWLFLSDWH´ZLWKUHVSHFWWRXSFRPLQJHOHFWLRQV as a function of system confidence (Study 1). 




Results of Linear Regression Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action without Adjusting for Attitudes toward the Out-group (Study 2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 3.66***  [3.53, 3.79] 3.72***  [3.55, 3.88] 
System confidence -0.01 -.01 [-0.11, 0.09] -0.02 -.01 [-0.12, 0.08] 
System confidence2    -0.03 -.04 [-0.08, 0.02] 
R2 .00 .002 
F F(1, 929) = 0.06 F(2, 928) = 0.71 
'R2  .001 
'F  F(1, 928) = 1.37 
Note. System confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.  
*** p < .001.  
 
  




Results of Linear Regression Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action with Adjustment Variables (Study 2) 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 3.79***  [3.63, 3.94] 
System confidence -0.03 -.02 [-0.12, 0.07] 
System confidence2 -0.06* -.07 [-0.11, -0.01] 
Gender  -0.32* -.08 [-0.57, -0.06] 
Age 0.39 .03 [-0.36, 1.14] 
Education -0.01 -.01 [-0.04, 0.03] 
Political conservatism 0.13** .09 [0.04, 0.22] 
Attitudes toward the out-group 0.55*** .34 [0.45, 0.65] 
R2 .13 
F F(7, 915) = 20.05*** 
Note. All continuous predictors were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 form men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100. 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 




Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration with Adjustment Variables (Study 3) 
Predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI 
Intercept 1.08*** 2.95  
Gender system confidence -0.57** 0.56 [0.38, 0.83] 
Gender system confidence2 -0.39* 0.68 [0.50, 0.94] 
Age -2.59** 0.08 [0.01, 0.47] 
Education -0.31 0.73 [0.43, 1.25] 
Social conservatism -0.10 0.90 [0.73, 1.13] 
Economic conservatism -0.07 0.93 [0.78, 1.11] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .20 
-2 log-likelihood 280.70 
Note. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100.  
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 




Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Support for Collective Action with the Influential Case Included (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 6.29***  [6.17, 6.41] 6.41***  [6.27, 6.55] 
Gender system confidence -0.39*** -0.33 [-0.52, -0.25] -0.32*** -.27 [-0.46, -0.18] 
Gender system confidence2    -0.15** -.20 [-0.24, -0.06] 
R2 .11 .15 
F F(1, 255) = 31.92*** F(2, 254) = 21.84*** 
'R2  .04 
'F  F(1, 254) = 10.57** 
Note. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.  
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 




Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Support for Collective Action with Adjustment Variables (Study 3) 
 B ȕ 95% CI 
Intercept 6.38***  [6.24, 6.52] 
Gender system confidence -0.24** -.20 [-0.40, -0.08] 
Gender system confidence2 -0.12* -.16 [-0.22, -0.03] 
Age -0.19 -.01 [-0.90, 0.71] 
Education 0.002 .001 [-0.21, 0.22] 
Social conservatism -0.10* -.14 [-0.19, -0.01] 
Economic conservatism -0.03 -.04 [-0.10, 0.05] 
R2 .16 
F F(6, 247) = 8.10*** 
Note. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. 
Influential case excluded.   
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Normative Collective Actions Intentions with the Influential Case Included (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor variable B ȕ B 95% CI B ȕ B 95% CI 
Intercept 5.84***  [5.66, 5.97] 5.84***  [5.66, 6.02] 
Gender system confidence -0.53*** -0.36 [-0.70, -0.36] -0.51*** -.34 [-0.70, -0.33] 
Gender system confidence2    -0.03 -.03 [-0.15, 0.09] 
R2 .13 .13 
F F(1, 255) = 46.66*** F(2, 254) = 18.42*** 
'R2  .001 
'F  F(1, 254) = 0.28 
Note. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.  
 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Normative Collective Action Intentions with Adjustment Variables with the Influential Case Included (Study 3) 
Predictor variable B ȕ 95% CI 
Intercept 5.81***  [5.63, 5.99] 
Gender system confidence -0.39*** -.26 [-0.60, -0.19] 
Gender system confidence2 -0.01 -.01 [-0.13, 0.11] 
Age -0.51 -.06 [-1.54, 0.53] 
Education -0.08 -.03 [-0.35, 0.20] 
Social conservatism -0.06 -.07 [-0.18, 0.06] 
Economic conservatism -0.14** -.19 [-0.24, -0.05] 
R2 .17 
F F(6, 247) = 8.29*** 
Note. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. 
Influential case LQFOXGHG&RRN¶V'. When the influential case identified for analyses without demographics is excluded, the quadratic effect is still 
negative but not significant, B = -.10 [-0.24, -@ȕ -.09, p = .127. 
**p < .01. *** p < .001. 




Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Non-normative Collective Action Intentions with Adjustment Variables (Study 3) 
Predictor variable B ȕ 95% CI 
Intercept 2.45***  [2.21, 2.69] 
Gender system confidence -0.21*** -.11 [-0.48, 0.07] 
Gender system confidence2 0.07 0.06 [-0.09, 0.23] 
Age -1.12 -.10 [-2.49, 0.25] 
Education 0.09 .03 [-0.27, 0.46] 
Social conservatism 0.01 .01 [-0.15, 0.17] 
Economic conservatism -0.21** -.21 [-0.33, -0.08] 
R2 .08 
F F(6, 247) = 3.71** 
Note. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. No 
LQIOXHQWLDOFDVHVLGHQWLILHG&RRN¶VD < 0.10). 
**p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 





Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration with Adjustment Variables (Study 4) 
Predictor variable B OR OR 95% CI 
Intercept 2.14*** 8.51  
System confidence -0.22 0.81 [0.54, 1.20] 
System confidence2 -0.41* 0.66 [0.47, 0.93] 
Age 6.53** 687.50 [9.10, 51921.86] 
Gender 0.06 1.065 [0.38, 3.01] 
Social conservatism 0.11 1.12 [0.87, 1.43] 
Economic conservatism -0.11 0.90 [0.69, 1.17] 
1DJHONHUNH¶VR2 .14 
-2 log-likelihood 177.39 
Note. System confidence, age, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. Gender coded -0.5 
for men and 0.5 for women.  
* p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 




Human Development Index, Gini coefficient and the Type of Political Regime for 60 Countries Participating in 
the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey (Study 5) 
 
Country WVS Year HDI HDI year Gini  Gini year Political Regime 
Algeriaabc 2014 0.736d 2014 35.3g 1995 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Argentinaabc 2013 0.833d 2013 42.3g 2013 Flawed democracy 
Armeniaabc 2011 0.723d 2011 31.3g 2011 Hybrid regime 
Australiaabc 2012 0.932d 2012 34.9g 2010 Full democracy 
Azerbaijanabc 2011-2012 0.7435ce 2011/2012 16.6g 2005 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Bahrain 2014 0.824d 2014 ± ± 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Belarusac 2011 0.793d 2011 26.5g 2011 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Brazilabc 2014 0.755d 2014 52.9g 2013 Flawed democracy 
Colombiaabc 2012 0.715d 2012 53.5g 2012 Flawed democracy 
Cyprusabc 2011 0.852d 2011 32.6g 2011 Flawed democracy 
Chileabc 2011 0.821d 2011 50.8g 2011 Flawed democracy 
China 2012 0.718d 2012 42.1g 2010 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Ecuadorab 2013 0.730d 2013 47.3g 2013 Hybrid regime 
Egypt 2012 0.688d 2012 30.8g 2008 Hybrid regime 
Estoniaabc 2011 0.849d 2011 32.7g 2011 Flawed democracy 
Georgiaabc 2014 0.754d 2014 40.0g 2013 Hybrid regime 
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Germanyabc 2013 0.915d 2013 30.1g 2011 Full democracy 
Ghanaabc 2011 0.566d 2011 42.8g 2005 Flawed democracy 
Hong Kongabc 2013 0.908d 2013 53.7h 2011 Flawed democracy 
Indiaabc 2012/2014 0.6045df 2012/2014 33.9g 2009 Flawed democracy 
Iraqabc 2013 0.657d 2013 29.5g 2012 Hybrid regime 
Japanabc 2010 0.884d 2010 32.1g 2008 Full democracy 
Jordan 2014 0.748d 2014 33.7g 2010 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Kazakhstanabc 2011 0.772d 2011 27.4g 2011 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Kuwait 2013 0.816d 2013 ± ± 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Kyrgyzstanabc 2011 0.639d 2011 27.8g 2011 Hybrid regime 
Lebanon 2013 0.768d 2013 ± ± Hybrid regime 
Libya 2013 0.738d 2013 ± ± Hybrid regime 
Malaysiaabc 2011 0.772d 2011 46.3g 2009 Flawed democracy 
Mexicoabc 2012 0.754d 2012 48.1g 2012 Flawed democracy 
Moroccoabc 2011 0.621d 2011 40.7g 2007 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Netherlandsabc 2012 0.920d 2012 28.0g 2012 Full democracy 
New Zealandabc 2011 0.907d 2011 36.2h 1997 Full democracy 
Nigeriaabc 2011 0.499d 2011 43.0g 2009 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Pakistanabc 2012 0.532d 2012 29.6g 2010 Hybrid regime 
Palestineabc 2013 0.679d 2013 34.5g 2009 Hybrid regime 
Peruabc 2012 0.728d 2012 45.1g 2012 Flawed democracy 
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Philippinesabc 2012 0.657d 2012 43.0g 2012 Flawed democracy 
Polandabc 2012 0.838d 2012 32.4g 2012 Flawed democracy 
Qatar 2010 0.844d 2010 ± ± 
Authoritarian 
Regime 
Romaniaabc 2012 0.788d 2012 27.3g 2012 Flawed democracy 
Russiaabc 2011 0.790d 2011 41.0g 2011 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Rwandaabc 2012 0.476d 2012 51.3g 2010 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Singapore 2012 0.905d 2012 46.3h 2013 Hybrid regime 
Sloveniaabc 2011 0.877d 2011 24.9g 2011 Flawed democracy 
South Koreaabc 2010 0.886d 2010 30.2h 2013 Full democracy 
South Africaabc 2013 0.663d 2013 63.4g 2011 Flawed democracy 
Spainabc 2011 0.870d 2011 36.1g 2011 Full democracy 
Swedenabc 2011 0.903d 2011 27.2g 2011 Full democracy 
Taiwan 2012 ± 2012 33.8h 2012 Flawed democracy 
Thailandabc 2013 0.724d 2013 39.3h 2012 Flawed democracy 
Trinidad and 
Tobagoabc 
2010 0.772d 2010 40.3g 1992 Flawed democracy 
Tunisiaabc 2013 0.720d 2013 35.8g 2010 Hybrid regime 
Turkeyabc 2011 0.751d 2011 40.0g 2011 Hybrid regime 
Ukraineabc 2011 0.738d 2011 24.6g 2011 Hybrid regime 
United Statesabc 2011 0.911d 2011 40.5g 2010 Full democracy 
Uruguayabc 2011 0.784d 2011 43.4g 2011 Full democracy 
Uzbekistanac 2011 0.661d 2011 35.3g 2003 
Authoritarian 
regime 
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Yemenabc 2013 0.498d 2013 35.9g 2005 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Zimbabweabc 2011 0.474d 2011 50.1h 2006 
Authoritarian 
regime 
Note. HDI = Human Development Index. Political regime based on the Economist Intelligence Unit data 
corresponding to the year of WVS survey. 
a Country included in the main text descriptive analysis  
b
 Country included in the main text analyses of collective action. 
c
 Country included in the main text analyses of voting.   
d
 United Nations Development Programme estimate.  
e
 The average of values for 2011 (0.742) and 2012 (0.745). 
f
 The average of values for 2012 (0.600) and 2014 (0.609). 
g
 World Bank estimate. 
h
 Central Intelligence Agency estimate (World Bank estimate unavailable). 





Individual-level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (no adjustment variables, 53 countries; Study 5) 
  
Predictor variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 1.53 (0.03)*** 1.57 (0.05)*** 1.35 (0.06)*** 1.33 (0.06)*** 
Individual level effects     
SC  -0.01 (0.01) 0.18 (0.04)*** 0.13 (0.05)** 
SC2   -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Societal level effects     
Political regime type    0.09 (0.14) 
SC u Political regime type    0.28 (0.09)** 
SC2 u Political regime type    -0.06 (0.02)*** 
Variance        
IL variation of DV 0.246 (0.009)*** 0.243 (0.009)*** 0.242 (0.009)*** 0.242 (0.009)*** 
SL variation of DV 0.063 (0.012)*** 0.104 (0.021)*** 0.142 (0.035)*** 0.140 (0.04)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC  0.007 (0.002)*** 0.078 (0.018)*** 0.066 (0.017)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC2   0.002 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.001)** 
SYSTEM CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT - SUPPLEMENT                                101 
 
 
-2 loglikelihood 109476.92 108734.40 108491.34 108460.91 
Note. SC = System confidence. System confidence was grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard 
errors reported in the parentheses. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Out of 60 countries participating in the 6th wave 
of WVS 7 (Bahrain, Belarus, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, Uzbekistan, Egypt) were excluded. Only adult (t 18) respondents included. Missing data handled with 
multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets). ICC (Model 1) = .20, 95% CI [.14, .27].  
 
**p < .01. *** p < .001. 
  
 




Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (No Multiple Imputation, 48 Countries; Study 5)   
Predictor variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 1.55 (0.04)*** 1.56 (0.04)*** 1.57 (0.04)*** 1.60 (0.04)*** 1.53 (0.04)*** 
Individual level effects      
SC  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.004 (0.013) 0.003 (0.01)  
SC2   -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01) 
Gender     -0.07 (0.004)*** -0.07 (0.004)*** 
Age    -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 
Education     0.04 (0.001)*** 0.04 (0.001)*** 
Political conservatism    -0.02 (0.001)*** -0.02 (0.001)*** 
Societal level effects      
Political regime type     0.33 (0.03)*** 
HDI     0.48 (0.32) 
Gini     0.01 (0.003)* 
Cross-level interactions      
SC u Political regime type     -0.03 (0.03) 
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SC2 u Political regime type     -0.06 (0.02)** 
Variance         
IL variation of DV 0.249 (0.001)*** 0.245 (0.001)*** 0.244 (0.001)*** 0.230 (0.001)*** 0.230 (0.001)*** 
SL variation of DV 0.065 (0.013)*** 0.065 (0.013)*** 0.070 (0.015)*** 0.068 (0.014)*** 0.040 (0.008)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC  0.008 (0.002)*** 0.008 (0.002)*** 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.007 (0.002)** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC2   0.003 (0.001)*** 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.001)** 
Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) 96829.08 96192.86 95239.47 76766.04 76737.39 
Note. SC = System confidence. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 
for other systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients 
reported. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with ML estimation.  ICC (Model 1) = .21, 95% CI [.14, .27]. 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 




Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (Different Reference Categories for Political Regime Types, 48 Countries; Study 5)   
  Reference category  
Predictor variable Authoritarian regime Hybrid regime Flawed democracy 
Intercept 1.42 (0.09)*** 1.39 (0.05)*** 1.57 (0.05)*** 
Individual level effects    
SC 0.001 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) 
SC2 -0.03 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 
Sex  -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** 
Age  -0.06 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) 
Education  0.04 (0.004)*** 0.04 (0.004)*** 0.04 (0.004)*** 
Political conservatism -0.02 (0.003)*** -0.02 (0.003)*** -0.02 (0.003)*** 
Societal level effects    
Authoritatian regimes  0.03 (0.09) -0.15 (0.11) 
Hybrid regime -0.03 (0.09)  -0.18 (0.08)* 
Flawed democracy 0.15 (0.11) 0.17 (0.08)*  
Full democracy 0.46 (0.15)** 0.49 (0.11)*** 0.32 (0.09)*** 
SYSTEM CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT - SUPPLEMENT                                105 
 
 
HDI -0.02 (0.37) -0.002 (0.37) -0.02 (0.37) 
Gini 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
Cross-level interactions    
SC u Authoritarian regime  -0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 
SC u Hybrid regime 0.02 (0.04)  0.03 (0.04) 
SC u Flawed democracy -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04)  
SC u Full democracy -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) 
SC2 u Authoritarian regime  -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
SC2 u Hybrid regime 0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02) 
SC2 u Flawed democracy 0.01 (0.02) -0.01(0.02)  
SC2 u Full democracy -0.04 (0.02)* -0.06 (0.02)** -0.05 (0.02)** 
Variance       
IL variation of DV 0.232 (0.008)*** 0.232 (0.008)*** 0.232 (0.008)*** 
SL variation of DV 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.034 (0.006)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC2 0.002 (0.000)** 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.002 (0.000)*** 
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Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) 94141.74 94139.60 94133.85 
Note. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior 
to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation 
(20 imputed datasets). 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 





Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (No Adjustment Variables, 57 Countries; Study 5) 
  
Predictor variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 
Individual level effects     
SC  
0.40 (0.04)*** 0.37 (0.04)*** 0.32 (0.04)*** 
SC2   
-0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 
Societal level effects     
Political regime type    1.09 (0.31)*** 
SC u Political regime type    0.33 (0.07)*** 
SC2 u Political regime type    -0.29 (0.10)** 
Thresholds     
Cut 1 -1.80 (0.14)*** -1.80 (0.06)*** -1.77 (0.09)*** -1.68 (0.13)*** 
Cut 2 -0.44 (0.14)** -0.42 (0.04)*** -0.39 (0.08)*** -0.29 (0.12)* 
Variance        
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SL variation of DV 1.04 (0.26)*** 1.13 (0.27)*** 1.18 (0.28)*** 0.99 (0.23)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC  0.08 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC2   0.04 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
-2 loglikelihood 141635.59 140274.04 140178.11 140151.49 
Note. SC = System confidence. System confidence was grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard 
errors reported in the parentheses. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Out of 60 countries participating in the 6th wave 
of WVS three (Bahrain, Egypt and Ecuador) were excluded. Only adult (t 18) respondents included. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed 
datasets). ICC (Model 1) = .24, 95% CI [.15, .33].  
 
** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 




Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (No Multiple Imputation, 49 Countries; Study 5)   
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Individual level effects      
SC  0.43 (0.05)*** 0.41 (0.04)*** 0.35 (0.05)*** 0.29 (0.05)*** 
SC2   -0.06 (0.03)  -0.05 (0.04) 0.003 (0.03) 
Gender     -0.09 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.04)* 
Age    0.36 (0.03)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 
Education     0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 
Political conservatism    0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Societal level effects      
Political regime type     0.87 (0.46) 
HDI     0.44 (1.40) 
Gini     0.02 (0.01) 
Cross-level interactions      
SC u Political regime type     0.30 (0.09)** 
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SC2 u Political regime type     -0.24 (0.10)* 
Thresholds      
Cut 1 -1.99 (0.14)*** -1.99 (0.08)*** -2.02 (0.06)*** -2.28 (0.09)*** -2.01 (0.17)*** 
Cut 2 -0.58 (0.14)*** -0.55 (0.06)*** -0.58 (0.03)*** -0.74 (0.08)*** -0.46 (0.16)** 
Variance         
SL variation of DV 0.91 (0.20)*** 0.94 (0.20)*** 0.99 (0.22)*** 0.92 (0.18)*** 0.80 (0.15)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC  0.10 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC2   0.04 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)* 
Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) 116841.90 114676.94 114589.87 90107.23 90089.60 
Note. SC = System confidence. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 
for other systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients 
reported. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with ML estimation.  ICC (Model 1) = .22, 95% CI [.14, .29], p < .001. Because 
there was no convergence for Models 4 and 5 when MLR estimator was used, we applied ML estimators in these two cases.  










Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (Different Reference Categories for Political Regime Types, 49 Countries; Study 5)   
  Reference category  
Predictor variable Authoritarian regime Hybrid regime Flawed democracy 
Individual level effects    
SC 0.30 (0.08)*** 0.28 (0.14)* 0.31 (0.07)*** 
SC2 0.02 (0.05) -0.12 (0.06) 0.003 (0.05) 
Sex  -0.09 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.04)* 
Age  0.35 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 
Education  0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 
Political conservatism 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Societal level effects    
Authoritatian regimes  -0.73 (0.33)* -1.00 (0.29)** 
Hybrid regime 0.64 (0.34)  -0.15 (0.34) 
Flawed democracy 0.91 (0.38)* 0.54 (0.37)  
Full democracy 1.44 (0.57)* 1.14 (0.53)* 0.73 (0.43) 
HDI -0.98 (1.74) -2.06 (1.61) -1.42 (1.60) 
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Gini 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
Cross-level interactions    
SC u Authoritarian regime  0.01 (0.17) -0.01 (0.10) 
SC u Hybrid regime -0.01 (0.16)  -0.02 (0.16) 
SC u Flawed democracy 0.01 (0.10) 0.03 (0.16)  
SC u Full democracy 0.28 (0.10)** 0.29 (0.17) 0.27 (0.09)** 
SC2 u Authoritarian regime  0.14 (0.08) 0.02 (0.06) 
SC2 u Hybrid regime -0.14 (0.07)*  0.12 (0.07) 
SC2 u Flawed democracy -0.02 (0.06) 0.12 (0.09)  
SC2 u Full democracy -0.30 (0.09)*** -0.16 (0.14) -0.28 (0.10)** 
Thresholds    
Cut 1 -1.40 (0.33)*** 0.28 (0.14)* -2.18 (0.19)*** 
Cut 2 0.10 (0.32) -0.12 (0.06) -0.67 (0.19)*** 
Variance       
SL variation of DV 0.67 (0.13)*** 0.67 (0.14)*** 0.66 (0.13)*** 
SL variation in IL effect of SC 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.02)*** 
0.07 (0.02)*** 
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SL variation in IL effect of SC2 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)** 
Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) 113953.05 113975.62 113960.17 
Note. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior 
to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation 
(20 imputed datasets). 

 p < .10. * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
